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Employee Mobility and The Low Wage 
Worker: The Illegitimate Use of Non-Compete 
Agreements 
JACQUELINE A. CAROSA, ESQ.† 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-compete agreements (NCAs) are contracts made 
between an employer and employee that restrict the 
employee’s postemployment opportunities.1 These restraints 
on trade limit an employee’s ability to take a position with a 
competitor, or start a competing business,2 within a defined 
geographic area for a defined period of time.3 NCAs provide 
an employer the assurance that trade secrets, confidential 
information, client relationships, or a former employee’s 
unique skills will not be unfairly used to benefit a 
 
†This Paper was researched and written while the author was a student at the 
University at Buffalo School of Law. She served as a Note and Comment Editor 
of The Buffalo Law Review, graduated cum laude in 2019, and was admitted to 
the practice of law in New York and New Jersey in 2019. 
The author thanks University at Buffalo School of Law Professor Lise Gelernter 
for her help with organizing and editing the content of this Paper. 
 1. Vanessa Maire Griffith, Non-Compete Agreements with Employees, 
Practical Law Practice Note 7-501-3409, Westlaw (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) 
[hereinafter Griffith Practice Note]. 
 2. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of 
Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 839 (2013) [hereinafter Driving 
Performance]. 
 3. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1. 
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competitor.4 
Nearly one in five workers in the United States is 
employed under an NCA, with greater prevalence in more 
highly skilled sectors5 where trade secrets, confidential 
client information, and highly specialized skills are common. 
However, NCAs have found their way into the low wage 
sector where there is no legally recognized legitimate 
business interest to protect. In fact, approximately 12% of 
earners who do not have a bachelor’s degree and make up to 
$40,000.00 a year have signed NCAs.6 
The public backlash against the use of NCAs for low 
wage workers has led to much discussion and many articles 
about why they should or should not be banned or regulated. 
 
 4. Id.; Rita Zeidner, Rethinking Non-compete Agreements, HR MAG., Dec. 
2017/Jan. 2018, at 67, https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P4-1975979529/ 
rethinking-noncompete-agreements [hereinafter “Rethinking Non-compete 
Agreements”]. 
 5. Evan Starr et al., Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force 14 (U.Mich. Law 
& Econ. Research Paper No. 18-013, 2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714 [hereinafter Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor 
Force] (18.1% of the U.S. labor force). This Paper relies heavily on the work of 
Evan Starr, an assistant professor at the University of Maryland Robert H. Smith 
School of Business. Prof. Starr has written and co-written a dozen scholarly 
papers on the use, enforceability, and effects of non-competes, six of which have 
been published at the time this Paper was originally submitted, and his work has 
been cited in U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFF. OF ECON. POL’Y, NON-COMPETE 
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST% 
20Non-competes%20Report.pdf [hereinafter OEP REPORT], and WHITE HOUSE 
REPORT, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, 
AND STATE RESPONSES, 6 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE 
REPORT]. Post-submission, Starr co-wrote Low-Wage Workers and the 
Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements with Michael Lipsitz (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452240.  The authors 
examined the effects of the 2008 ban against non-compete agreements for hourly 
and low-wage workers in the State of Oregon and concluded that the ban resulted 
in higher hourly wages on average, increased job mobility, increased the 
proportion of salaried worker, decreased the likelihood of being unemployed, 
without affecting hours worked. Id. at 26. 
 6. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3. 
2019] NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS D3 
 
Jimmy John’s made the headlines and received a great deal 
of negative press when it came to light that their franchisees 
were requiring sandwich makers and delivery drivers to sign 
NCAs.7 The NCAs prevented departing employees from 
performing services for any company deriving “more than ten 
percent (10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, hero-
type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches” 
for a postemployment period of two years.8 The NCAs 
covered a geographic area of between two and three miles “of 
either [the Jimmy John’s location in question] or any such 
other Jimmy John’s Sandwich Shop.”9 Investigations and 
lawsuits by the New York and Illinois State Attorneys 
General offices led the company to settle the suits and agree 
to halt the practice.10 
E-commerce giant Amazon received sharp criticism for 
requiring its hourly employees, including warehouse and 
seasonal workers, to sign NCAs.11 The NCAs were extremely 
broad in scope and stated that the employee could not: 
directly or indirectly . . . engage in or support the development, 
manufacture, marketing, or sale of any product or service that 
competes or is intended to compete with any product or service sold, 
 
 7. Sarah Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses Following 
Settlement, CNBC, (June 22, 2016, 1:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-drops-non-compete-clauses-following-settlement.html 
[hereinafter Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses]. 
 8. Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign 
‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFPOST, (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:03 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_ 
5978180.html?1413230622 [hereinafter Jamieson, Oppressive Noncompete 
Agreements]. 
 9. Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses, supra note 7; 
Jamieson, Oppressive Noncompete Agreements, supra note 8. 
 10. Whitten, Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses, supra note 7; 
Jamieson, Oppressive Noncompete Agreements, supra note 8. 
 11. Jana Kasperkevic, Amazon Removes Crazy Non-compete From Hourly 
Worker’s Contracts, BUS. INSIDER, (Mar. 29, 2015, 10:42 AM), 
www.businessinsider.com/amazon-removes-non-compete-clause-for-hourly-
workers-2015-3. 
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offered, or otherwise provided by Amazon (or intended to be sold, 
offered, or otherwise provided by Amazon in the future) that 
employee worked on or supported, or about which employee 
obtained or received Confidential Information.12 
Aside from requiring the gift of clairvoyance, the 
restraint theoretically prevented employment at companies 
that were not direct competitors of Amazon. The NCA’s reach 
was so vast that the ordinary employee would find it difficult 
to avoid breaching the contract. Indeed, the contract states 
that the employee “recognizes that the geographic areas for 
many of Amazon’s products and services . . . are extremely 
broad and in many cases worldwide.”13 Given the breadth of 
Amazon’s products and services, the scope of the limitation 
was potentially devastating to the livelihood of its employees. 
Ultimately, due to the negative publicity, Amazon agreed to 
stop the practice for its hourly employees.14 
In addition to sandwich makers and warehouse workers, 
NCAs have also been used to tie other low wage workers to 
their jobs, such as labor hands,15 hairdressers, camp 
counsellors,16 and residential and commercial cleaners.17 The 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Lauren C. Williams, Amazon Gets Rid of Strict Non-Compete Clause for 
Contract and Temporary Employees, THINKPROGRESS, (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:15 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/amazon-gets-rid-of-strict-non-compete-clause-for-
contract-and-temporary-employees-f7b12b94cfa9/. 
 15. Conor Dougherty, How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, N.Y. 
TIMES, (May 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/ 
noncompete-clauses.html [hereinafter How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers 
Locked In]. 
 16. Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of 
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/ 
business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html?_r=0. 
 17. Danny Westneat, $15-an-hour Job Comes With Noncompete Clause, 
Threat of Legal Action, SEATTLE TIMES, (Nov. 11, 2014, 8:30 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/15-an-hour-job-comes-with-
noncompete-clause-threat-of-legal-action/ (discussing the circumstances in which 
an employee of ServiceMaster Seattle found himself when he took a job with a 
rival company to make $3 more an hour). 
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use of NCAs has gone beyond protecting businesses from 
unfair competition. They are now used to control employee 
turnover and manipulate free markets by limiting fair 
competition. 
Focusing on the low wage sector, this paper discusses the 
pros and cons of using NCAs and argues that the benefits of 
banning NCAs outweigh the possible harm enough to justify 
legislation. Part I discusses the at-will employment 
relationship, the history of NCAs, and legally protectable 
legitimate business interests. Part II discusses the 
regulation of NCAs and includes a description of current 
state law and judicial interpretations. 
Part III presents the incidence, benefits, and costs 
associated with the use of NCAs. The studies and statistics 
show that there is much to gain for both employer and 
employee in banning NCAs for low wage workers, but it is 
not without potential cost to the employer and possible 
detriment to the low wage employee.18 Nevertheless, because 
NCAs are intended to prevent unfair competition and protect 
legitimate business interests, it begs the question: Are low 
wage workers in a position to compete unfairly if they do not 
possess unique skills or have access to trade secrets and 
confidential information?  
Part IV discusses recent litigation and legislative 
initiatives, includes a summary of reasons why NCAs should 
be banned in the low wage sector, and presents this author’s 
conclusion that such action is justified because there is no 
recognized legitimate business interest to protect. Further, 
the benefits of banning NCAs in the low wage sector 
outweigh the harm so dramatically that  states should 
continue to consider bills banning NCAs for low wage 
workers and imposing restrictions on and requirements for 
 
 18. OEP REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4; Evan Starr, Consider This: Training, 
Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 INDUS. & LAB. REV. 
783, 785–86 (2019). 
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the use of NCAs for all other workers. This paper touches on 
several current and proposed federal and state initiatives. 
However, to provide a legitimate basis to propose legislation 
in my home state of New York, this paper focuses primarily 
on current and proposed initiatives in New York. Because 
recent legislative efforts have failed in my state, Part IV 
includes a piece of proposed legislation for New York State, 
which is combination of the recently passed Massachusetts 
legislation and bills previously introduced in the New York 
State Assembly and Senate. 
I. THE HISTORY OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 
A. At-Will Employment 
Most states in the United States are at-will employment 
states.19 At-will employment means that both employer and 
employee have the right to terminate the employment 
relationship at any time, for any reason, without notice.20 
This “right” can produce harsh results to both parties when 
the relationship is terminated without cause or notice. “The 
original purposes of the employment at-will doctrine were to 
afford employees the freedom to contract to suit their needs 
and to allow employers to exercise their best judgment 
regarding staffing matters.”21 Notwithstanding its 
harshness, the at-will rule gives businesses autonomy over 
hiring practices and promotes employee mobility. 
Today, the average person changes jobs an average of 12  
 
 19. Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, NCSL, At-Will Employment – Overview, 
NCSL.ORG (Apr. 15, 2008) http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/ 
at-will-employment-overview.aspx [hereinafter NCSL]. 
 20. Id. This assumes the employee is not part of a legally-protected class, or 
that the termination circumstances do not violate a law or regulation. 
 21. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333 (1987); see also NCSL, 
supra note 19 (“Some reasons given for our retention of the at-will presumption 
include respect for freedom of contract, employer deference, and the belief that 
both employers and employees favor an at-will employment relationship over job 
security.”). 
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times during his or her career.22 Having the flexibility to 
make career moves  encourages workers to find the best 
possible employment fit and gives employers a large pool 
from which to recruit the best possible employees for their 
business. It follows, then, that an employee needs a way out 
of an entry-level job in order to keep his or her career moving 
forward and upward. At-will employment is a reciprocal 
right that promotes both of those goals. 
The most clear-cut exception to the presumption of at-
will employment is a written employment contract 
demonstrating the parties’ intent to modify the at-will 
relationship. For example, employment contract terms can 
be tailored to require progressive discipline prior to 
termination, termination for good cause, 30 or more days-
notice prior to termination, and so on. In addition to written 
contracts signed by the parties, an employer with an express 
written policy modifying the at-will rule - such as a rule 
contained in an employee handbook - may well be bound by 
the policy’s representations in the absence of a clear 
disclaimer if the employer  induces reliance on the policy.23 
If a legally valid contract modifies the at-will rule, it will be 
viewed as the best representation of the parties’ intent.24 
Having the flexibility to come and go at will leaves open 
the possibility that the employee will re-enter the job market 
 
 22. Alison Doyle, How Often Do People Change Jobs?, BALANCE CAREERS, 
(updated Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/how-often-do-
people-change-jobs-2060467; see also Scott Marker, How Many Jobs Will the 
Average Person Have in His or Her Lifetime?, LINKEDIN, (Feb. 22, 2015), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-many-jobs-average-person-have-his-her-
lifetime-scott-marker (reporting 12-15 jobs according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). 
 23. NCSL, supra note 19; Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co., 96 N.Y.2d 312, 316 
(2001). Note that “routinely issued employee manuals, handbooks, and policy 
statements should not lightly be converted into binding employment 
agreements.” Id. at 317. 
 24. Goldman v. White Plains Ctr. for Nursing Care, LLC, 11 N.Y.3d 173, 176 
(2008). 
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as a direct competitor of the former employer. Without a 
contract to the contrary, the employee is free to secure 
employment to best suit his or her needs. The line separating 
fair competition from unfair competition is crossed when a 
former employee absconds with trade secrets, client lists, key 
employees, or confidential information. Reasonable 
safeguards against unfair competition should be in place to 
protect businesses, business owners, and their employees 
from losses that result from unfair competition. Restrictive 
covenants—non-compete, non-disclosure, and non-solicit 
agreements—have been used to mitigate those losses. 
B. The Rise and Evolution of Non-Compete Agreements 
NCAs are a vehicle by which an employer can limit an 
employee’s prospective employment opportunities.25 Their 
use has been traced back to the 1400’s when craftsmen tried 
to prevent their apprentices from starting a competing 
business in the same locale.26 At that time, courts refused to 
enforce NCAs, in favor of free movement in the labor 
market.27 The English court case of Mitchel v. Reynolds is 
credited with marking the shift toward judicial acceptance of 
the reasonableness of partial restraints on trade.28 Mitchel 
leased a bakery from Reynolds for five years. The parties 
entered into an agreement, upon consideration, that should 
Reynolds compete with Mitchel’s bakery during the term of 
 
 25. MARION G. CRAIN, ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 303 (3d ed. 
2015); Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1. 
 26. Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 
20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 504 (2016); W. Andrew Arnold, Non-Compete 
History, SC NONCOMPETE LAWYER, http://www.scnoncompetelawyer.com/short-
history-of-non-competes/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 27. Arnold, supra, note 26. 
 28. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Queens’ Bench 1711). Mitchel v. Reynolds has also been 
cited by the dissent in United States Supreme Court as the “standard for testing 
the enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade which are ancillary to a 
legitimate transaction, such as an employment contract . . . .” Bus. Elec. Corp. v. 
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 737 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the parties’ five-year lease, Reynolds would have to pay 
Mitchel on a bond for 50 pounds. Reynolds breached, Mitchel 
sued, and Reynolds countered that the restraint on his trade 
was unlawful. The court held that the contract was valid as 
a reasonable restraint on trade because it was limited in time 
and geographic scope and was necessary to protect Mitchel’s 
business.29 
In an effort to prevent unfair competition, NCAs have 
traditionally been used to protect legitimate business 
interests such as: 1. trade secrets or confidential information; 
2. customer relationships; 3. investment in the employee’s 
reputation in the market; and 4. purchase of a business 
owned by the employee.30 However, as industrial and global 
economies evolved, so too have employer motivations for 
using NCAs. In addition to preventing unfair competition, 
NCAs are now used to reduce the costs of employee 
turnover,31 increase the cost of competition,32 control free 
markets,33 and depress wage growth.34 
NCAs may have seemed less necessary in the age of 
lifelong, stable employment relationships, where 
compensation packages were attractive enough to create a 
loyal workforce. Employers like Eastman Kodak, General 
Motors, Xerox, and Wegmans boast some of the lowest rates 
 
 29. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep at 352; Arnold, supra note 26. 
 30. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 8.07(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
2015). 
 31. OEP Report supra note 5, at 3. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15 
(explaining non-competes are used to “prevent the forces of competition”). Such a 
restraint would be unenforceable on public policy grounds if it is unreasonably 
“determinantal to the smooth operation of a freely competitive private economy.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 comment (a), (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). 
 34. Consider This, supra note 18, at 18, 19, 24, 25. 
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of turnover.35 Low turnover employers enjoy not only better 
employee morale and higher productivity, but need to spend 
much less on training and recruitment than their high- 
turnover counterparts.36 However, the numbers show that 
lifelong employment is not the norm, resulting in increased 
costs related to employee turnover and training.37 
The costs associated with employee turnover vary from 
business to business, but the cost may be as much as twice 
the employee’s annual salary, especially for those at the 
higher end of the compensation spectrum.38 A study by the 
Society for Human Resource Management estimates that six 
to nine months of an employee’s earnings are spent finding 
and hiring a replacement.39 A study by the Center for 
American Progress (CAP) found that the cost to replace a 
$10/hour employee would be $3,328.00, or 16% of the 
employee’s annual earnings.40 For employees earning 
between $30-50,000.00, the cost rises to 20%.41 These 
replacement costs typically include the costs of hiring, 
onboarding, and lost productivity.42 Notwithstanding the 
 
 35. Vivian Giang, A New Report Ranks America’s Biggest Companies Based 
on How Quickly Employee Jump Ship, BUSINESS INSIDER, (July 25, 2013, 8:41 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/companies-ranked-by-turnover-rates-
2013-7; Max Nisen, Wegmans is a Great Grocery Store Because it’s a Great 
Employer, QUARTZ, (May 13, 2015), https://qz.com/404063/new-york-city-is-
getting-a-great-grocery-store-in-wegmans-and-an-even-better-employer/. 
 36. Christina Merhar, Employee Retention—The Real Cost of Losing an 
Employee, PEOPLE KEEP, (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.zanebenefits.com/blog/ 
bid/312123/employee-retention-the-real-cost-of-losing-an-employee [hereinafter 
“Employee Retention”]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Julie Kantor, High Turnover Costs Way More Than You Think, 
HUFFPOST, (updated Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-
kantor/high-turnover-costs-way-more-than-you-think_b_9197238.html. 
 40. Employee Retention, supra note 36. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. The 2014 Training Industry Report from Training Magazine sets the 
annual training budgets for small businesses at $1,200.00 per employee. Tess C. 
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high cost of turnover, most companies do not know how much 
turnover costs their company and don’t even try to figure it 
out.43 
Controlling turnover and limiting postemployment 
opportunities has the effect of maintaining a stable 
workforce, thus reducing turnover and the costs associated 
with it.44 However, controlling turnover is not recognized by 
most courts in the United States as a protectable legitimate 
business interest that would justify the use of NCAs.45 
Without a judicially recognized protectable business interest, 
the use of NCAs is neither legitimate nor in good faith under 
current law. In fact, the recent phenomenon of using NCAs 
to tie low wage workers to a job has even been described as a 
form of modern-day slavery and violative of Thirteenth 
Amendment rights against involuntary servitude.46 
II. HOW NON-COMPETES HAVE BEEN REGULATED 
A. Antitrust Laws and Regulation at the Federal Level 
 
Taylor, The Costs of Training New Employees, Including Hidden Expenses, 
FORBES, (June 2, 2017, 5:09 PM)), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2017/06/02/ 
the-costs-of-training-new-employees-including-hidden-expenses/#6f6be1bbafb2. 
 43. Jack Altman, How Much Does Employee Turnover Really Cost?, 
HUFFPOST, (updated Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
how-much-does-employee-turnover-really-cost_us_587fbaf9e4b0474ad4874fb7 
[hereinafter How Much Does Employee Turnover Really Cost?]. 
 44. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 10. 
 45. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389–93. In fact, a review of Russell Beck’s 
Employee Noncompetes, A State by State Survey does not indicate a single state 
that recognizes controlling turnover as a legitimate business interest, although 
AL, AK, AR, CO, DC, FL, GA, IN, KS, KY, LA, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, VT recognize 
some investments in training. Russell Beck, Beck, Reed Riden LLP, Employee 
Noncompetes, A State By State Survey, FAIR COMPETITION LAW (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/2019/10/21/50-state-noncompete-chart-
updated-october-2019-fl-me-md-nh-or-ri-wa/ [hereinafter Beck’s State By State 
Survey].  
 46. See, e.g., Ayesha Bell Hardaway, The Paradox of the Right to Contract: 
Non-compete Agreements as Thirteenth Amendment Violations, 39 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 957 (2016). 
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There is no current federal law that prohibits or places 
restrictions on the use of NCAs. However, there have been 
efforts to use antitrust laws to defeat the enforceability of 
NCAs, though they have not been widely accepted. For 
example, Jonathan Pollard, a Florida attorney specializing 
in litigating complex non-compete, trade secret, trademark 
and unfair competition cases, believes that “virtually all non-
compete agreements [are] illegal restraints on trade”47 and 
that the agreements should be evaluated as restraints on 
trade subject to antitrust scrutiny.48 He has tried to use 
Florida state antitrust law to defeat enforceability, but finds 
that antitrust arguments have not gained traction in Florida 
state trial courts. Pollard asserts that “the vast majority of 
judges are completely unfamiliar with the antitrust 
principles that underlie Florida law” and “simply do not 
understand the law’s origins.”49 Indeed, in response to 
Pollard’s antitrust arguments, one federal judge stated: “You 
might have something with this antitrust but I don’t know.”50 
In Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross,51 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had this to say 
about the use of the Sherman Act52 in non-compete cases: 
In affirming the district court, we need not pass upon the general 
applicability of the federal antitrust laws to postemployment 
restraints. Although such issues have not often been raised in the 
federal courts, employee agreements not to compete are proper 
 
 47. Jonathan Pollard, Non-Compete News & Notes—August 2018, THE NON-
COMPETE BLOG, (Aug. 24, 2018) https://thenoncompeteblog.com/2018/08/24/ 
non-compete-news-notes-august-2018/. 
 48. Jonathan Pollard, 9th Circuit: Non-Competes Subject to Antitrust 
Analysis, THE NON-COMPETE BLOG, (Apr. 2, 2017), https://thenoncompete 
blog.com/2017/04/02/9th-circuit-non-competes-subject-to-antitrust-analysis/. 
 49. Jonathan Pollard, Monopolists & Non-Compete Agreements, THE NON-
COMPETE BLOG, (Apr. 6, 2017), https://thenoncompeteblog.com/2017/04/06/ 
monopolists-non-compete-agreements/. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
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subjects for scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. When a 
company interferes with free competition for one of its former 
employee’s services, the market’s ability to achieve the most 
economically efficient allocation of labor is impaired.53 
Moreover, employee-noncompetition clauses can tie up 
industry expertise and experience and thereby forestall new 
entry.  
The Court explained that “[r]estraints on 
postemployment competition that serve no legitimate 
purpose at the time they are adopted would be per se invalid” 
under the Sherman Act and that “even if the clause is not 
overbroad per se, it might still be scrutinized for 
unreasonableness… Restraints that fail this balancing test 
might be struck down under a rule of reason.”54 However, the 
balancing test can be difficult for courts to administer and 
lead to inconsistent results. The complex nature of this 
judicial analysis has been recently criticized by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC). 
In his Comment on Competition and Consumer 
Protection in the 21st Century, Federal Trade Commissioner 
Rohit Chopra provides an illustrative and informative 
discussion on the role of the FTC in promoting fair 
competition and the current state of antitrust law.55 He 
explains that antitrust law today is “developed exclusively 
through adjudication,” which requires judges to perform 
analyses that call for speculation and the application of 
“complex antitrust standards” that are difficult to 
administer.56 This yields unpredictable and inconsistent 
 
 53. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 625, 627 (1960). 
 54. Newburger, 563 F.2d at 1082. 
 55. See Comment of Rohit Chopra, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment on 
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Docket ID FTC-2018-
0074 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_ 
statements/1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf. 
 56. Id. at 2. 
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results.57 In addition, antitrust litigation is “protracted and 
expensive, requiring extensive and costly expert 
analysis,”58and “lacks adequate democratic participation”59 
because “broad swaths of market participants” are left on the 
sidelines.60 
To address these shortcomings, Chopra suggests that 
FTC rulemaking (1) allows the FTC to provide clear notice to 
market participants that respects due process 
considerations; (2) helps alleviate issues tied to adjudication, 
such as the protracted and costly nature of a legal remedy; 
and (3) facilitates a process that gives the public a voice and 
mechanism by which to be heard before any rule is issued.61 
To support FTC rulemaking, Chopra posits that there are 
“areas where private litigation is unlikely to discipline 
anticompetitive conduct” and he uses the example of NCAs 
to make his point.62 The Commissioner argues: 
In theory, workers could bring a lawsuit alleging that certain 
noncompete clauses are anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. In 
practice, however, private litigation in this area is effectively 
nonexistent . . . Any challenges must be pursued in 
isolation . . . . Given the paucity of private litigation challenging 
noncompete agreements as antitrust violations, the FTC might 
consider engaging in rulemaking on this issue. A rule could remove 
any ambiguity as to when noncompete agreements are permissible 
or not. Pursuing this through rulemaking might be far speedier—
and fair—than engaging in enforcement activities.”63 
Chopra concludes that “the status quo suffers from 
 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Id. at 2. 
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 5. Chopra explains that this would advance Congress’ intention that 
the FTC collect data regarding business practices from market participants, use 
the data to identify market trends, and “establish market-wide standards 
clarifying what practices constitute[] an “unfair method of competition.” 
 62. Id. at 10. 
 63. Id. 
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ambiguity, resource burden, and a deficit of democratic 
participation”64 and “urge[s] interested parties to explore 
whether and how rulemaking might lead to antitrust policy 
that is more predictable, efficient, and participatory.”65 FTC 
rulemaking may, in the future, have favorable results for 
employees and provide much needed guidance to employers. 
In the meantime, the bulk of NCA regulation has been left to 
the states. 
B. States as Regulators 
Like most contract issues, NCAs have largely been left 
to the states to regulate.66 The employment relationship is 
fundamentally contractual because employment terms are 
fixed by an agreement between the parties.67 Because 
contract law rules apply, the agreement must be supported 
by adequate consideration.68 In most states, the offer of at-
will employment is sufficient consideration for an 
enforceable contract,69 but some states require additional 
consideration.70 Depending on the state, additional 
consideration might be a promise to provide confidential 
information or specialized training, stock options, or garden 
leave.71 A garden leave provision is an agreement that an 
employer will continue to pay an employee after termination 
of the employment relationship so long as the employee 
 
 64. Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. at 11. 
 66. J.J. Prescott, et al., Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 
Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 393 (2016). 
 67. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements 
and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 379, 380 (Dec. 2016). 
 68. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.; Angie Davis, et al., Developing Trends in Non-Compete Agreements 
and Other Restrictive Covenants, 30 A.B.A J. LAB. & EMP. L. 255, 267 (2015). 
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provides notice of termination in accordance with the agreed 
upon terms and refrains from working for a competitor 
during the payment period.72 Additional consideration is one 
tool that can be used to attract candidates to open positions 
and provide compensation for forfeited postemployment 
opportunities. 
To protect employees from the harsh results of limited 
postemployment opportunities, some states have passed a 
variety of legislation limiting or prohibiting the use of 
NCAs.73 For example, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New York and Washington have laws restricting use of NCAs 
in the broadcast industry.74 Connecticut prohibits the use of 
NCAs for security guards.75 Tennessee and New Mexico are 
two states that have placed restrictions on the use of NCAs 
for health care providers.76 Laws in New Hampshire require 
disclosures of NCAs prior to acceptance of an offer of 
employment, while Oregon requires disclosure at least two 
weeks before the first day of employment.77 Laws in North 
Dakota and Montana prohibit the use of NCAs except in 
regard to the sale or dissolution of a business.78 
There has also been some successful recent state 
legislation limiting non-compete use. For example, Illinois 
successfully passed legislation banning the use of NCAs for 
low wage earners. The Freedom to Work Act applies to NCAs 
entered into on or after Jan. 1, 2017 and prohibits private 
employers for entering into NCAs with low wage workers 
 
 72. Davis, et al, supra note 71, at 267. 
 73. For a summary of the current law in each state, see Non-Compete 
Agreements, 0060 SURVEYS 23, 50 State Statutory Surveys: Employment: 
Private Employment, (Nov. 2017) Westlaw; see also Beck’s State By State Survey, 
supra note 48. 
 74. Non-Compete Agreements, supra note 73. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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making less than $13 per hour or minimum wage, whichever 
is greater.79 
On October 1, 2018, the Massachusetts Noncompetition 
Agreement Act went into effect, placing limitations and 
requirements on the use of NCAs, including prohibiting the 
agreements for employees classified as nonexempt under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act,80 undergraduate or graduate 
student internships, employees laid off or fired without cause 
and employees under 18 years of age.81 There is no specific 
prohibition for low wage workers, but there is a requirement 
that a NCA be supported by garden-leave or other agreed 
upon consideration.82 
 
 79. Illinois General Assembly, Illinois Compiled Statutes, Illinois Freedom to 
Work Act (820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 90/1), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ 
ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3737&ChapterID=68. 
 80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1)–(19) (2012) delineate the classes of employees that 
are exempt from the protections under the FLSA, such as, for example, “any 
employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional 
capacity,” or “in the capacity of outside salesman,” or “any employee employed in 
connection with the publication of any . . . newspaper” with a limited circulation. 
Most employees are non-exempt and are entitled to paid overtime. Employees 
paid less than $23,600.00 per year, hourly employees, and employees that do not 
work in the areas delineated under the FLSA are non-exempt. 
 81. MGL c.149, § 24L, (added by St. 2018, c.228, § 21) 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2018/Chapter228; Erik J. 
Winton and Colin A. Thakkar, Massachusetts Legislature (Finally) Passes Non-
Compete Law, (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/ 
massachusetts-legislature-finally-passes-non-compete-law; see also Melissa L. 
McDonagh and Kevin E. Burke, Massachusetts Legislature Passes 
Comprehensive Noncompete Reform, (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.littler.com/ 
publication-press/publication/massachusetts-legislature-passes-comprehensive-
noncompete-reform. Massachusetts also has laws prohibiting the use of non-
compete agreements for certain professions. See https://www.mass.gov/info-
details/massachusetts-law-about-noncompetition-agreements. 
 82. MGL c.149, § 24L, (added by St. 2018, c.228, § 21) 
https://malegislature.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2018/Chapter228; See also 
Beck, Reed, Riden, LLP, Massachusetts Noncompete and Trade Secret Reform 
Has Arrived: What You Need to Know, FAIR COMPETITION LAW, (Aug.1, 
2018), https://www.faircompetitionlaw.com/2018/08/01/massachusetts-
noncompete-and-trade-secret-reform-has-arrived-what-you-need-to-know/. 
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C. General Trends and Judicial Doctrines 
In addition to a variety of state-specific legislative 
approaches to the issue, state courts have adopted their own 
state-specific interpretations of the law on NCAs. For 
example, some states are “high enforcing” states, which 
means the courts in the state are more likely to enforce the 
NCA, and others are “low” or “nonenforcing” states.83 Some 
courts will reform an unreasonable contract and others will 
find it unenforceable or void.84 
The judicial decision to enforce an agreement that 
contains an unreasonable covenant depends on which 
doctrine the state court has adopted. Courts have three 
options when dealing with terms they deem unreasonable: 
(1) throw the entire contract out, including reasonable terms 
and provisions (red-pencil rule); (2) strike out only the 
offensive provisions of the contract (blue-pencil rule); or (3) 
reform the contract to make the terms reasonable85 (the 
reformation or “purple-rule” doctrine).86 While the red-pencil 
rule is a harsh remedy, it would encourage employers to draft 
only reasonable agreements for fear that the entire contract 
would be voided if any part is found invalid. The other rules 
do not serve to discourage employers from including 
unreasonable terms in an NCA, but they ensure employer 
 
 83. Consider This, supra note 18, at 9-10, 51, 53. For example, Florida, 
Kansas, and Connecticut are considered high enforcement states while 
California, North Dakota, and New York are considered low enforcement states. 
 84. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45 (providing a comprehensive 
list of states and the applicable restrictions).  
 85. Andrew P. Torrez, Of Red and Blue Pencils: Three Ways in Which States 
Can Respond to Defective Noncompete Clauses, (May 1, 2014), 
https://www.zuckerman.com/news/blog/red-and-blue-pencils-three-ways-which-
states-can-respond-defective-noncompete-clauses.  
 86. Hannesson Murphy, How the 50 States Differ on Revising Non-Competes: 
Different Strokes for Different Folks (or Red, Blue and Purple-Pencil America), 
(Jan. 5, 2014), THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW, https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/how-50-states-differ-revising-non-competes-different-strokes-different-
folks-or-red-. 
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protection in cases where an NCA has been poorly drafted. 
More than 30 states have adopted the practice of contract 
reformation, including Massachusetts, New York, New 
Jersey, and Tennessee.87 About a dozen states strike out the 
unreasonable provisions while leaving the remainder of the 
contract intact, under the blue-pencil rule, while the red-
pencil rule remains largely unapplied by state courts.88 
An employee can challenge the validity and 
enforceability of an NCA and there are a variety of causes of 
action available to do so. For example, courts may consider 
various claims such as tortious interference,89 intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, breach by the employer, 
fraudulent misrepresentation, unconscionability, bad faith, 
duress, lack of capacity, or coercion.90 While employees do 
have causes of action available to them, many lack the 
resources to fund a lawsuit. 
D. The New York Example 
With each state taking its own unique approach to 
NCAs, it may be helpful to take a closer look at how one state 
has attacked the issue. Since it is my intention to present a 
proposed bill for New York State, the following is a picture of 
the existing state of non-compete law in New York. 
Currently, New York State has taken limited steps to 
restrict the use of NCAs. New York Labor Law Sec. 202-k 
prohibits the use of NCAs for employees in the broadcast 
industry,91 but legislation was proposed in the 2017 session 
to amend Section 202-k to allow the agreements for “key” 
 
 87. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45. 
 88. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45. 
 89. NBT Bancorp, Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 614, 
621 (1996). 
 90. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1. This is not an exhaustive list of 
available defenses. 
 91. N.Y. Lab. Law § 202-k (McKinney 2019). 
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employees in the industry.92 There is currently no state law 
that prohibits the use of NCAs in the low wage sector. 
In New York courts, NCAs “are not favored and thus are 
strictly construed”93 because of the “powerful considerations 
of public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of 
a [person’s] livelihood.”94 Indeed,  courts in the State are at 
the lowest end of the enforcement spectrum out-ranked only 
by California and North Dakota.95 New York courts have 
ruled against enforceability of terms that are onerous96 or 
overbroad,97 but they have not considered the specific issue 
of the enforceability of a non-compete against a low wage 
earner. 
BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg is the often-cited New York 
Court of Appeals case on the standards of enforcing NCAs in 
New York.98 In BDO, the Defendant was employed by the 
Plaintiff as an accountant and was required to sign an NCA 
as a condition of promotion.99 The NCA contained a provision 
requiring the Defendant to pay BDO “1 ½ times the last 
annual billing for any such client” in the event that the 
Defendant provided services for any BDO client within 18 
months of termination of employment.100 Approximately four 
 
 92. A5102/S521 would amend 202-k to allow non-competes for employees 
making $250,000.00 or more from an employer licensed in a city with a 
population in excess of 1 million, or an employee making $100,000.00 or more 
from an employer licensed in a city with a population of less than 1 million. 
https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=+a5102. 
 93. Goodman v. N.Y. Oncology Hematology, P.C., 101 A.D.3d 1524, 1526 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2012). 
 94. Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, 25 N.Y.3d 364, 370 (2015), (quoting 
Gramercy Park Animal Ctr. v. Novick, 41 N.Y.2d 874, 874). 
 95. Consider This, supra note 18, at 51.  
 96. Goodman, 101 A.D.3d at 1528. 
 97. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 388 (1999). 
 98. Id. at 382. 
 99. Id. at 387. 
 100. Id. 
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months after signing the NCA, the Defendant resigned and 
allegedly took with him 100 BDO clients.101 BDO attempted 
to recover lost revenue pursuant to the NCA, but the 
Defendant denied serving some of the clients and argued 
that a “substantial number of them were personal clients he 
had brought to the firm through his own outside contacts.”102 
When the Defendant refused to pay the allegedly lost 
revenue, BDO sued to recover under the contract.103 
Referring to the standard of reasonableness for NCAs 
announced in the English court case Mitchel v. Reynolds, the 
Court of Appeals discussed the “modern, prevailing common-
law standard of reasonableness in determining the validity 
of employee agreements not to compete.”104 The Court 
explained that an employment restraint is reasonable “only 
if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the 
legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose 
undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to 
the public.”105 Reasonableness “focuses on the particular 
facts and circumstances” of each case.106 If a contract violates 
any prong of the reasonableness test, it is rendered 
invalid.107 
New York courts require the employer to prove all three 
prongs of the test before the burden shifts to the employee to 
show that the restraint is overbroad or unnecessary.108 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 388. 
 103. Id. at 387. 
 104. Id. at 388. 
 105. Id. at 388–89. These criteria are used by other courts as well, for example, 
Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45. 
 106. BDO Seideman, 93 N.Y.2d at 390. 
 107. Id. at 388–89. 
 108. Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Johnson, 25 N.Y.3d 364, 369–70 (2015). This case 
points out the difference between the burden shift in New York and Florida, with 
New York’s standard being the more employee-friendly of the two. The Court also 
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Under the first prong, legitimate employer interests are 
limited to: (1) protection from competition by a former 
employee whose services are unique or extraordinary; (2) 
protection against the misappropriation of trade secrets or 
confidential customer lists; and (3) protection against 
appropriating the goodwill of clients or customers.109 
In BDO, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate 
Division’s decision voiding the entire covenant and declining 
partial enforcement and dismissed concerns that “employers 
will use their superior bargaining position to impose 
unreasonable anti-competitive restrictions, uninhibited by 
the risk that a court will void the entire agreement.”110 The 
Court rejected a per se rule invalidating an overbroad 
agreement,111 adopting, instead, a case-by-case approach 
focusing on the conduct of the employer in which partial 
enforcement could be justified if the employer “demonstrates 
an absence of overreaching, coercive use of dominant 
bargaining power, or other anti-competitive misconduct, but 
has in good faith sought to protect a legitimate business 
interest, consistent with reasonable standards of fair 
dealing.”112 The BDO Court held that the facts justified 
partial enforcement, finding no coercion, a “general plan to 
forestall competition,” or bad faith.113 
 
found the agreement’s choice of Florida law as contrary to New York public policy 
and unenforceable.  
 109. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389–93. 
 110. Id. at 394. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 395; see also Mister Softee, Inc. v. Tsirkos, 14 Civ. 1975 (LTS)(RLE), 
2014 WL 2535114, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Under New York law, a court may 
partially enforce an overly broad non-compete covenant if plaintiff sought to 
protect a legitimate business interest . . . New York has rejected strict 
divisibility, or “blue-pencil” requirement, instead embracing flexible partial 
enforcement of restrictive covenants. However, a court should not attempt to 
partially enforce a non-compete provision where its infirmities are so numerous 
that the court would be required to rewrite the entire provision.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
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The issue of employer bad faith resurfaced recently in 
Long Is. Minimally Invasive Surgery, P.C. v. St. John’s 
Episcopal Hosp., where the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed a Nassau 
County Supreme Court decision to invalidate an employment 
covenant rather than modify it.114 In St. John’s, an action 
was commenced to recover damages for breach of an 
employment contract.115 Plaintiff, a medical practice, and 
Defendant, Dr. Andrade, entered into a three-year 
employment contract that contained a non-compete clause 
barring Andrade from performing any kind of surgery for two 
years within 10 miles of any of Plaintiff’s offices and 
affiliated hospitals.116 The Plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
that a 10-mile restriction was necessary to protect its 
interests.117 Rather than modify the covenant, the lower 
court opted to throw it out.118 The Appellate Court 
acknowledged that courts have “given greater weight to the 
interests of the employer”119 when considering contracts 
between professionals, yet found the restriction 
unreasonable and questioned the Plaintiff’s good faith in 
attempting to enforce it.120 The court found that applying 
“the factors set forth in BDO Seidman militates against 
partial enforcement” where plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
anticompetitive misconduct, was seeking to impose an 
overbroad covenant and used its superior bargaining position 
in refusing to negotiate terms while compelling the employee 
to sign the contract.121 
 
 114. Long Is. Minimally Invasive Surgery, P.C. v. St. John’s Episcopal Hosp., 
164 A.D.3d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 576. 
 117. Id. at 577. 
 118. Id. at 578. 
 119. Id. at 577. 
 120. Id. at 578. 
 121. Id. 
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The necessity of demonstrating a legitimate business 
interest and reasonable postemployment limitations was 
recently discussed in Hoffman v. Raftopol.122 The Plaintiff, a 
dermatologist, moved for an injunction against a former 
physician’s assistant (P.A.) for violating an NCA that 
prohibited the P.A. from taking a position within 2 years 
from termination in a 15 mile radius from Plaintiff’s office.123 
The court considered use of NCAs in the health care 
industry, but found “the more difficult question” to be 
whether the restriction protects “the legitimate interest of 
the employer.”124 Quoting from the New York Court of 
Appeals case Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mgf., the court 
acknowledged that NCAs will be enforced “only if reasonably 
limited temporally and geographically, and then only to the 
extent necessary to protect the employer from unfair 
competition which stems from the employee’s use or disclosure 
of trade secrets or confidential customer lists.”125 In Hoffman, 
the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a legitimate interest in 
preventing her former employee from working within a 15 
mile radius of her office. Consequently, the Court limited 
injunctive relief to enjoining the P.A. from soliciting 
Plaintiff’s clients for 2 years.126 
These 2018 cases did not involve low wage employees, 
but they offer insight regarding the necessity of the employer 
to act in good faith and demonstrate a legitimate interest in 
preventing the employee’s competition. These cases 
illustrate the uphill battle employers face in New York courts 
and other low-enforcement states should they either try to 
enforce an NCA against an employee who poses no risk of 
 
 122. 2018 NY Slip Op 50020(U), 58 Misc.3d 1209(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 
2018). 
 123. Id. at *1–2. 
 124. Id. at *6. 
 125. Id. at *7, (quoting Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 42 
N.Y.2d 496, 499 (1977)) (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at *11. 
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unfair competition or impose overreaching restrictions that 
are not necessary to protect legitimate business interests. 
For those who elect to challenge the validity of an NCA 
in New York, the first line of offense is to attack the contract 
itself by reading its plain language. Has the employee in fact 
violated the terms of the contract or is the employer trying to 
expand the scope or purposely misinterpret the terms? Is the 
restrictive covenant reasonable in scope as to time and 
geography or is it overreaching as in the Amazon and Jimmy 
John’s cases? Is it unduly burdensome to the employee or 
harmful to the public as in St. John’s and Hoffman? Is the 
employer trying to protect a legitimate business interest or 
merely preventing fair competition and reduce training 
costs? Will enforcement create a bar to employment for the 
employee or will the employee still be able to make a living 
in his or her area of expertise? The terms of the NCA should 
be no more restrictive than necessary to protect the 
employer’s legitimate business interests from unfair 
competition. 
III. INCIDENCE, BENEFITS AND COSTS OF NON-COMPETE 
AGREEMENTS 
A. Incidence of Non-Compete Use 
The use of NCAs has flourished since the 1400’s. 
Research conducted by Evan Starr, JJ Prescott, and Norman 
Bishara (“Starr U.S. Labor Force Report”) suggests that 
nearly one in five workers in the U.S. (18.1%) are employed 
under NCAs.127 While more prevalent in certain high-skilled 
occupations, NCAs are commonly found in many other 
industries. The Starr U.S. Labor Force Report breaks down 
the incidence of NCAs by occupation, annual earnings, and 
education.128 The occupational analysis reveals the 
 
 127. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 14. 
 128. Id. 
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percentage of employees in a given industry who have signed 
an NCA: engineering and architectural (36%), computer and 
mathematical (35%), business and financial (23%), and 
managerial (30%). Yet even employees in occupations such 
as office support (14%), food preparation (11%), production 
(16%), and legal occupations (10%) sign NCAs.129 
The annual earnings analysis reveals that 13.5% of low 
wage earners making no more than $40,000.00 per year are 
currently bound by an NCA .130 That means approximately 
5.5 million American low wage workers have signed an 
NCA.131 Notwithstanding the millions of workers bound by 
non-competes, this author could find no litigated case filed 
by a low wage employee to challenge the legitimacy of an 
NCA. This author speculates that this is the case because (1) 
employees lack the incentive or financial resources to risk 
legal action and (a) are sufficiently chilled when served with 
a cease and desist letter or (b) negotiate a settlement with 
their employer, even if the agreement is not legally 
enforceable. The paucity of cases filed by employers to 
enforce NCAs against low wage workers leads this author to 
the conclusion that employers have no intention of taking 
legal action NCAs against low-wage employees and rely on 
the agreements solely as a scare tactic to control turnover or 
limit fair competition.132 
The education analysis finds that 12% of respondents 
without a bachelor’s degree and earning less than $40,000.00 
 
 129. Consider This, supra note 18, at 40. 
 130. Id. at 15. 
 131. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY WAGE STATISTICS FOR 2018, 
https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/netcomp.cgi?year=2018. Approximately 40,794,371 
workers fall in the $20–40,000.00 income bracket. This figure is 13.5% of that 
number. 
 132. I speculate this is because employers have no intention of enforcing the 
agreements, possibly because (1) their legal counsel has advised against it; (2) 
legal fees and costs make enforcement impracticable; (3) for fear of public 
backlash or judicial admonition; or (4) because the chilling effect created by use 
obviates the need for litigation. 
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annually have signed an NCA,133 while 34.7% of respondents 
without a four-year degree reported to having signed an NCA 
at some point in the past and 14.3% reported currently being 
bound by an NCA.134 A 2016 Report from the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, 
(“2016 OEP Report”) found that the percentage of employees 
working under an NCA is nearly the same for those without 
a four-year degree as it is for all other workers.135 
The 2016 OEP Report also discusses the incidence of 
NCAs.136 The Report offers explanations for why NCAs are 
used in sectors where trade secrets are not at issue: (1) the 
agreements provide assurance to an employer that “workers 
are unlikely to leave for some period of time, allowing the 
firm to capture more of the increased productivity from costly 
training it provides, and workers receive more training than 
they would otherwise;” (2) the agreements allow employers 
to hire employees who do not expect to leave imminently; (3) 
employees do not pay attention to non-compete agreements 
and are not aware of the rights they are giving up; (4) 
employees were not presented with the agreement until they 
accepted the job offer.137 
With nearly 20% of all workers bound by an NCA  and 
over 10% of low wage workers restricted by the agreements, 
the question is whether employers are using them to protect 
legitimate business interests or if employers are using them 
to control turnover and fair competition. 
B. Benefits of Non-Compete Use 
In addition to serving their original purpose of protecting 
 
 133. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3. 
 134. Id. at 15. 
 135. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 11. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 8–9. 
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an employer against direct competition by a former 
employee, NCAs can also protect an employer’s trade secrets, 
confidential information, and investments in specialized 
training.138 This willingness to allocate company assets to 
training may be due to the assurance that the employee will 
be either unlikely to leave the company,139 or, if the employee 
does leave he or she will be contractually barred from 
accepting employment with a competing firm.140 
The 2016 OEP Report focuses on the economic effects of 
non-compete contracts on individual workers and society as 
a whole.141 The Report acknowledges the potential social 
benefits of the agreements: 1. protection of trade secrets; 2. 
greater employer incentive to provide costly training; and 3. 
identification of workers looking for long-term employment 
opportunities.142 
In some cases, NCAs may also benefit an employee 
through additional training, higher wages, and might even 
include compensation after termination of the employment 
relationship.143 A low wage worker with access to trade 
 
 138. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1; see also Bridget Miller, Pros and Cons 
of Noncompete Agreements, HR DAILY ADVISOR, (Apr. 30, 2014), https://hrdaily 
advisor.blr.com/2014/04/30/pros-and-cons-of-noncompete-agreements/. 
 139. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 8. “In general, firms are reluctant to pay for 
training that improves a worker’s ‘general’ skills and makes her more valuable 
to it and other firms alike. Economists usually think of general training as 
occurring when workers accept wage cuts to compensate their employer for its 
expenses in providing training. For various practical reasons, however, workers 
may be unwilling to pay for training.” 
 140. Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: 
A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee 
Noncompetes, 80 Or. L. Rev. 1163, 1203–04 (2001) (“[D]espite the strategic 
importance of cultivating internal talent, employers may not make such 
investments for fear that their efforts will merely aid the competition.”). 
 141. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3–8. 
 142. Id. at 3. 
 143. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1; see also Bridget Miller, Pros and Cons 
of Noncompete Agreements, HR DAILY ADVISOR, (Apr. 30, 2014), https://hrdaily 
advisor.blr.com/2014/04/30/pros-and-cons-of-noncompete-agreements/.; 
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secrets, if such an employee exists, may benefit from 
additional training because an employer with some 
guaranteed return on their investment is more motivated to 
expend resources on training.144 Professor Evan Starr 
explains that research shows employees in high enforcing 
states are more likely to receive firm sponsored training.145 
However, this is affected by timing. According to data 
gathered by Starr, employees who signed an NCA prior to 
taking a job reported an 11% increase in training over 
employees who signed after taking a job.146 Approximately 
6% of respondents indicated that they were promised 
training in exchange for signing an NCA 147 and the data 
suggests that NCAs entered into in highly enforceable states 
are associated with more training.148 However, in the 
absence of equal bargaining power, employee-respondents 
reported that they received no compensation in wages or 
training for signing the agreement.149 
Starr concludes that firms respond to the increased 
protection of their confidential information by providing 
more training to their employees.150 While employees in 
highly enforceable or “high use” states have a higher 
probability of training opportunities (30%), so too do “low 
use” employees see a rise in training, but at a lower rate 
 
According to Starr’s data, when non-compete agreements are signed before 
accepting a job offer, respondents reported 9.7% higher wages. Noncompetes in 
the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3. However, when signed after taking the 
job, employees did not receive a training benefit. Id. By contrast, the OEP Report 
found lower wage growth and lower wages in highly enforcing states. OEP 
Report, supra note 5, at 19. 
 144. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3. 
 145. Consider This, supra note 18, at 26–27.  
 146. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3. 
 147. Id. at 27. 
 148. Id. at 29. 
 149. Id. at 32. 
 150. Consider This, supra note 18, at 8, fn13.  
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(16%).151 In addition, low use employees see more basic 
training (32%) than their high use counterparts (25%), and 
see less training to upgrade skills (69%) than their high use 
counterparts (74%).152 
Another benefit of NCAs is that they may add value to a 
company considering a sale, merger, or acquisition.153 
However, some courts have held that changes in ownership 
change the identity of the employer, which requires a new 
agreement and renders the original NCA void.154 
Finally, in addition to additional training and fostering 
client confidence,155 NCAs can provide a sense of job security 
and reassurance to co-workers who do not have to worry 
about fellow employees unfairly competing against them. 
Some employees take comfort in knowing that their 
coworkers’ postemployment opportunities will not endanger 
their jobs. 
C. Costs Associated with Non-Compete Agreements 
 
 151. Id. at 41.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Michael R. Greco, 8 Reasons Why Small Businesses Should Use Non-
Compete Agreements, TLNT, (June 5, 2012), https://www.tlnt.com/8-reasons-
why-small-businesses-should-use-non-compete-agreements/ [hereinafter “8 
Reasons”]. For example, in Pino v. Spanish Broad. Sys of Fla., Inc., 564 So.2d 186, 
189, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), the court held that an assignable or transferrable 
employment contract that includes a non-compete can be enforced by the 
purchaser against the employee. In Great American Opportunities, Inc. v. 
Cherrydale Fundraising, LLC, the court held that that “absent specific language 
prohibiting assignment, noncompete covenants, even though part of a personal 
service contract, remain enforceable by an assignee when transferred to the 
assignee as part of a sale or transfer of business assets regardless of whether the 
employment contract contains a clause expressly authorizing such assignability, 
so long as the assignee engages in the same business as the assignor.” No. 3718-
VCP, 2010 WL 338219 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2010). 
 154. For example, Massachusetts law requires a new agreement when the 
employment relationship undergoes a “material change.” Griffith Practice Note, 
supra note 1. 
 155. 8 Reasons, supra note 151. 
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1. Bargaining Power Forfeited, Lower Wages, and 
Reduced Job Satisfaction 
Also identified in the 2016 OEP Report are the costs 
associated with NCAs. For example, agreements not to 
compete forfeit an employee’s bargaining power156 and can 
result in lower wages.157 This is because an employee who is 
bound by an NCA  may have limited prospective employment 
opportunities and the agreement may effectively tie him or 
her to a current position for which the employee is 
overqualified. Having no good employment options in his or 
her field of expertise, an employee lacks the leverage 
necessary to negotiate better employment terms with the 
employer, such as a wage increase or a better benefit 
package.158 
Timing can limit an employee’s bargaining position. One 
survey cited in the 2016 OEP Report found that in 70% of 
cases, the employee was asked to sign the NCA after 
declining other offers of employment, and in almost 50% of 
cases, the agreement was not disclosed until or after the 
employee’s first day on the job.159 This lack of transparency 
has a direct impact on the employer/employee relationship. 
Employees asked to sign an NCA  after accepting an 
employment offer are 12.5% less satisfied with their job and 
experience no wage and training benefits.160 By contrast, 
employees who sign prior to accepting a job offer and have 
alternative employment options earn 9.7% higher wages, are 
 
 156. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 9. 
 157. Id. at 19. 
 158. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 18–19. Starr reports 
that negotiation over noncompetes is rare, with 10% of those surveyed attempting 
to negotiate terms. He finds, however, a difference in negotiating depending on 
timing, with more employees attempting to negotiate if the agreement is 
presented prior to accepting a job offer than after acceptance. 
 159. Compare OEP Report, supra note 5, at 12–13, with Noncompetes in the 
U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 18 (61% of individuals with non-competes first 
learned they would be asked to sign before accepting job offer). 
 160. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 3. 
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11% more likely than average to receive training and are 
6.6% more likely to be satisfied in their employment.161 
In addition, there are other situations in which NCAs 
lead to lower wages, depressed wage growth, less disposable 
income, and fewer opportunities to improve one’s social-
economic station.162 For instance, an employee bound by an 
NCA  may be forced to take a job outside his or her area of 
expertise, to comply with contract terms or to err on the side 
of caution by declining a job opportunity in order to avoid a 
breach. Or, he or she may be willing to take a position at a 
much lower wage than other prospective candidates.163 Aside 
from the obvious negative impact this has on the affected 
employee and his or her family, it also has a negative impact 
on other employees in that field by keeping wages in that 
industry lower than they otherwise would be. Further, 
prospective candidates who refuse to agree to an NCA  will 
be eliminated from the job pool, reducing the number of 
qualified candidates to “bid up” wages.164 
2. Impact on Job Creation, Recruitment & Mobility 
Non-compete agreements may reduce job creation and 
result in fewer available jobs, thus reducing a worker’s 
chance to find the best possible employment match.165 This 
affects the whole of society because preventing workers from 
taking jobs that best suit their career goals reduces “job 
 
 161. Id. at 2, 25. 
 162. White House Report, supra note 5, at 6 (suggesting that high enforcement 
states “see lower wages in general, and that wage disparities between high and 
low enforcement states actually grow as workers age.”). 
 163. Noah Smith, Noncompete Agreements Take a Toll on the Economy, 
BLOOMBERG OPINION, (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/ 
articles/2018-03-22/noncompete-agreements-take-a-toll-on-the-economy. 
 164. Id. See also Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 30 
(“[W]ith early notice, employees may also be more careful in accepting the job 
from among their set of alternatives, thereby encouraging firms to compete for 
their services by offering better employment packages.”). 
 165. OEP Report supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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churn” and lowers productivity.166 Further, when an 
employee is prevented from working in his or her chosen 
field, which allows the employee to collect a paycheck and 
contribute to the tax base, he or she may have no alternative 
other than to file for unemployment or utilize other public 
support programs. 
Additionally, recruiting efforts may be hampered 
because an employer is prevented from recruiting the best 
possible candidates to fill open positions.167 This can happen 
when the very best candidates refuse to interview with a 
company that requires an NCA. Therefore, employers may 
be forced to hire less qualified or experienced workers 
leaving businesses with increased training expenses. Indeed, 
it is for these very reasons that some employers have never 
used or have eliminated use of non-competes.168 Some 
companies have used their opposition to the agreements as a 
recruiting tool to entice interviewees with the ability to move 
their careers in a new direction at a time of interviewee’s 
choosing.169 
The importance of employee mobility cannot be 
understated. Allowing the employee to move on to better 
employment conditions benefits her as well as the employer 
and the worker who takes his or her place. This makes 
employee mobility a valuable commodity because it allows 
workers an opportunity to better their lives, creates 
employment opportunities for other workers, improves 
employee morale, keeps the employment pool fluid, helps 
employers fill ordinary positions, benefits society because 
skills are being used to their maximum potential, and works 
 
 166. Id. at 4. “Job churn helps to raise labor productivity by achieving a better 
matching of workers and firms.” 
 167. Rethinking Non-compete Agreements, supra note 4, at 63–64 (discussing 
the perspective of Josh James, CEO of Domo, that the agreements undercut his 
company’s ability to attract qualified workers). 
 168. Id. at 66. 
 169. Id. at 65. 
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well with at-will employment principles, which favor the 
ability of the parties to terminate employment at any time, 
for any reason. 
Freedom of movement may be even more important to 
low wage workers than to their higher wage counterparts. A 
low wage worker may be quite willing to change jobs for a 
very small increase in his or her compensation as compared 
to higher wage workers who may be less likely to start over 
with a new employer. Consider a mere $40/week raise. A 
highly compensated employee would likely see the raise as 
not substantial enough to justify changing jobs and starting 
over with a new employer. However, to the lower wage 
worker making $25,000.00 annually, a $2,080.00 annual 
increase is a significant raise (almost 10%) and could serve 
as sufficient motivation to change employment.170 
Some low wage workers may be especially vulnerable to 
the harsh realities of employment restraints. For example, 
school-aged employees and recent graduates paying off 
student loans need the ability to move from job to job without 
restraint and may not understand the implications of signing 
NCAs. If a student has loans, he or she may take the first job 
offer in retail or fast food that comes along just to save money 
for school or pay bills. A full-time student may be limited to 
sectors that offer part-time employment and needs the 
flexibility of changing jobs if a more lucrative opportunity 
presents itself. 
3. The Chilling Effect and Unrealized Potential 
Non-competes have the potential of forcing an employee 
to forgo using an acquired skill set or give up his or her 
chosen occupation under threat of legal action.171 This threat 
 
 170. This assumes 52 paid work weeks. 
 171. How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15; 
Stephanie Russell-Craft, I Learned the Hard Way Why Non-competes are Bad for 
Journalists, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/non-compete-agreement-journalism.php 
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creates a chilling effect,172 causing an employee to remain in 
a job where he or she may be unhappy, unchallenged, and 
overqualified. Consequently, another employer is deprived of 
the employee’s skill set, while the current employer retains 
an unhappy employee who may lack the proper motivation 
to perform to his or her potential. Dissatisfied and unhappy 
employees take a toll on a company by cultivating a negative 
work environment, discouraging co-workers from achieving 
their maximum potential, wasting management’s time, and 
reducing profit margins.173 Chilling also affects an 
employee’s co-workers. When an employer litigates against a 
former employee in bad faith, co-workers can become fearful 
that they too will be sued if they resign their position even if 
the contract is unenforceable. 
The chilling effect created by companies threatening to 
enforce an NCA is real and can be devistating. In an article 
about her own experience involving a non-compete that cost 
her a job with Reuters, Stephanie Russell-Kraft, a journalist, 
discusses the use of the non-compete by her former employer, 
Law360, a subsidiary of LexisNexis.174 According to Russell-
Craft, she was assured on her first day of work in 2013 that 
Law360 had never used the agreement to prevent an 
employee from taking another job.175 Notwithstanding 
verbal representations, when she left Law360 in 2015 for a 
position at Reuters, Law360 sent a warning letter to Reuters, 
which prompted her termination.176 Russell-Craft was told 
the NCA was probably illegal, but she lacked the funds to 
 
[hereinafter “I Learned the Hard Way”]. 
 172. How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15; White 
House Report, supra note 5, at 11.  
 173. Richard Trevino II, A Few Disgruntled Employees Can Destroy Your 
Company Culture, THE ENTREPRENEUR, (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/319065. 
 174. I Learned the Hard Way, supra note 169. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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prove it in court.177 This is a clear example of the chilling 
effect that even unenforceable non-competes can have on 
employees. In her article, Russell-Kraft identified other 
media outlets that used the agreements, such as the social 
and video news company NowThis News,178 the conservative 
website Independent Journal Review, and global media 
company Mashable.179 Law360 reached an agreement in 
2016 with the New York State Attorney General’s Office, 
agreeing to stop the use of the agreements for its editorial 
employees.180 This was of little help to Russell-Kraft, who 
had to settle for a much less attractive benefit package as a 
freelancer.181 Again, her experience provides a relatable 
example of the damaging effects of non-competes on 
employees and the whole of society. 
 For employees who have the funds to avail themselves 
of a legal remedy, it is important to keep in mind that, in 
most cases, the employee will have to retain an attorney and 
absorb the expense of fees and costs related to such legal 
action. An employee lacking the financial resources to 
commence an action or defend against one, like Russell-
Craft, may likely be forced to cease and desist and forfeit her 
legal remedy. Even NCAs that are clearly overreaching and 
unenforceable can cause a chilling effect because employees 
simply lack the resources to obtain a declaratory judgment 
either striking the agreement entirely or modifying the 
unreasonable terms. 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; See also Cora Lewis, Steven Perlberg, Now This Forbids Staff From 
Taking Jobs at Other News Outlets, BUZZFEED NEWS, (updated June 9, 2017, 
4:17 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/coralewis/nowthis-news-
noncompete. 
 179. I Learned the Hard Way, supra note 169. 
 180. Eric T. Schneiderman, New York’s attorney general hos gotten Law360 to 
stop requiring non-compete agreements for its journalists https://www.niemanlab 
.org/reading/new-yorks-attorney-general-has-gotten-law360-to-abandon-non-
compete-agreements-for-its-journalists/ (2016). 
 181. I Learned the Hard Way, supra note 169. 
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In other words, low wage workers who are the most likely 
workers to lack the financial means, support, or motivation 
obtain no benefit from available legal remedies because they 
lack the funds to consult and retain with counsel, or because 
they do not know there is a legal remedy available to them. 
In addition, taking offensive legal action against a former 
employer is risky for the employee because prospective 
employers may be discouraged from hiring the applicant for 
lack of references, for fear of future litigation, or due to a 
reputation damaged through rumors.182 Employees need to 
consider the public nature of a lawsuit and must weigh the 
risks against the benefits.183 
4. Unjust Enrichment 
In the low wage sector, where NCAs are more often used 
to control turnover costs rather than protect legitimate 
business interests, there is the possibility that the 
agreement can unjustly enrich the employer. This is because 
at some point during the employment relationship the 
employer may be sufficiently compensated for the costs of 
training but the NCA remains in force resulting in a windfall 
to the employer.184 
In his article, Protecting Employer Investment in 
Training: Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, Brandon 
Long discusses investments in training and how best to 
 
 182. Janice Harper, What to Expect if You Sue Your Employer, HUFFPOST, 
(updated Mar. 11, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/janice-harper/what-to-
expect-when-you-s_b_1194955.html. 
 183. See Howard Levitt, These Lawsuits Against an Employer Will Make it 
Hard to Land a New Job, FINANCIAL POST, (Aug. 25, 2015, 1:36 PM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/executive/management-hr/these-lawsuits-
against-an-employer-will-make-it-hard-to-land-a-new-job; Hal Lancaster, What 
Are the Risks You Face When You Sue Your Employer?, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, (Apr. 15, 1997, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB8610536538328000. 
 184. Brandon S. Long, Protecting Employer Investment in Training: 
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 Duke L.J. 1295, 1315 (Mar. 2005). 
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protect those investments. He acknowledges that NCAs are 
not widely recognized as the proper tool for controlling 
turnover and training costs,185 but are, nevertheless, used for 
that purpose. Rather than bind an employee by an NCA, 
Long suggests the use of a repayment agreement that would 
reimburse the employer for the cost of training should the 
employee quit before the cost of training is recouped by the 
employer.186 By allowing the company to calculate “the cost 
of training and the revenue generated from the employee’s 
use of training, the employer can [] determine when it has 
broken even” and training costs have been recouped.187 Long 
finds this approach more favorable, in part, because most 
NCAs are valid for the entire duration of an employee’s 
tenure, yet an employer may recoup costs associated with 
training well before the employment relationship is 
terminated.188 This overprotection gives the employer a 
windfall at the employee’s expense because the employer 
remains protected long after the training investment has 
been repaid.189 
Long’s approach has the potential of protecting 
employees against employer overreach, but it requires 
businesses to ascertain the amounts allocated for training. 
As discussed above, most companies do not know how much 
turnover costs their company and don’t even try to figure it 
out.190 Calculating cost and recoupment time could cost 
employers money and find them allocating assets for a task 
that benefits the employee more than employer. In addition, 
policing the method of calculating recoupment costs would 
 
 185. Id. at 1311 (“A survey of 105 noncompete cases did not even find the 
employer’s investment in training significant enough to warrant discussion.”). 
 186. Id. at 1311–20. 
 187. Id. at 1319. 
 188. Id. at 1315–16. 
 189. Id. 
 190. How Much Does Employee Turnover Really Cost?, supra note 43. 
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require the enforcement agency or court to conduct complex 
case-by-case analyses that may result in inconsistent and 
unpredictable rulings. 
5. Deprivation of Critical Goods and Services 
Non-competes can also prevent consumers from 
obtaining critical goods and services, like health care.191 For 
example, preventing a health care worker from practicing 
medicine or working as a health aide deprives the whole 
community of necessary medical care and possibly life-saving 
treatments, notwithstanding the legitimate business 
interests potentially at stake.192 To address this issue, some 
states have passed laws banning the use of NCAs for 
employees in the health care industry.193 Restricting the 
ability of a medical professional, health care worker, or other 
provider of critical services to move from one employer to 
another deprives the public of that worker’s skill and 
expertise and results in injury to the community. 
6. Use of Non-Competes in Terminations Without 
Cause 
Using an NCA  to protect legitimate business interests 
allows an employer to use the agreement as a shield against 
unfair competition. However, sometimes employers use the  
agreements as a sword to control free markets and fair 
competition. For example, imagine an employer who hires a 
skilled employee under an NCA  knowing he or she cannot 
afford to retain the employee long-term. The employer hires 
the candidate under a NCA and then subsequently 
terminates the employee without cause and for no reason 
other than to prevent competing businesses from hiring the 
employee and benefitting from his or her skill set and to 
 
 191. White House Report, supra note 5, at 14–15. 
 192. Id. at 14–15. 
 193. For example, Delaware, Colorado, Texas, New Mexico have passed 
legislation. See id. at 7, 15.  
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prevent the employee from working in his or her area of 
expertise.194 While this scenario involving a highly skilled 
employee may not play out in the low-wage sector, the idea 
of hiring an employee under an NCA  and then terminating 
the employee without cause is certainly a scenario that can 
affect the low wage worker. 
According the 2016 OEP Report, approximately half of 
the states in the U.S. find, or are likely to find, NCAs 
enforceable against employees who are fired without 
cause.195 The knowledge that an employer could use an NCA  
offensively discourages prospective employees from 
accepting a position with an employer who requires a non-
compete. More importantly, vesting this degree of power in 
the employer can have devastating effects on an employee 
who has done nothing to deserve termination, not to mention 
the potentially devastating effect on area businesses and fair 
competition. As discussed earlier, at-will employment gives 
the employer and employee the same rights to terminate the 
employment relationship without notice or cause, allowing 
the employer to manage his staffing issues and giving the 
employee the freedom to keep his or her career moving 
forward and upward. Using at-will employment in tandem 
with a non-compete restraint interferes with the purposes 
that justify the at-will relationship by preventing the 
employee from exercising control over his or her career. 
New York is an interesting state to look at because there 
appears to be either a real or perceived judicial split 
regarding whether non-competes remain in effect after an 
involuntary termination without cause.196 In Post v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., the New York Court of 
 
 194. E.g., How Noncompete Clauses Keep Workers Locked In, supra note 15.  
 195. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 16; Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 
45 (providing a comprehensive list of states, including AL, CT, DE, GA, ID, IL, 
IN, KS, LA, ME, MI, MN, MS, MO, NJ, NC, OH, PA, SD, TN, TX, UT VA, WA). 
 196. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45. According to this chart, courts 
in New York are split.  
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Appeals dealt with a situation in which the Plaintiffs, two 
employees of Merrill Lynch, were fired without cause and, 
thereafter, entered into competition against their former 
employer.197 Plaintiffs’ pension plan was tied to a non-
compete provision in their employment contracts.198 By 
competing with the Defendant, Merrill Lynch argued that 
the Plaintiffs had forfeited their rights to their pension 
plan.199 The Court held that “[a]n employer should not be 
permitted to use offensively an anticompetition clause 
coupled with a forfeiture provision to economically cripple a 
former employee and simultaneously deny other potential 
employers his services.”200  
Some New York courts have interpreted Post as voiding 
NCAs if an employee is terminated without cause, while 
others draw a distinction because the Post noncompete was 
tied to a forfeiture of pension rights. In Wise v. Transco, Inc., 
the appellate court distinguished the holding in Post, and 
explained that “while plaintiff [in Wise] was involuntarily 
discharged, th[e] restrictive covenant does not involve a 
forfeiture of rights under an “employee pension benefit plan” 
that would be covered by ERISA.”201 By contrast, in SIFCO 
Industs., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Tech., Inc., the federal 
District Court adopted a different interpretation of Post, 
holding that “New York courts will not enforce a non-
competition provision in an employment agreement where 
the former employee was involuntarily terminated [without 
 
 197. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 84 (1979). 
 198. Id. at 87. 
 199. Id. at 87. 
 200. Id. at 89. “In Post, the New York Court of Appeals held that an employee 
discharged without cause has the right to challenge the reasonableness of a 
noncompetition forfeiture clause, not that such an employee is automatically 
excused from adhering to the clause.” Peter L. Altieri, David J. Clark, After 
Termination “Without Cause”: Restrictive Covenants, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN 
(Feb. 8 2007), https://www.ebglaw.com/news/after-termination-without-cause-
restrictive-covenants/. 
 201. Wise v. Transco, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 1039, 1039 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).  
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cause].”202 In finding that the defendants were involuntarily 
terminated, the court held the agreements unenforceable.203 
Because there appears to be some disagreement in 
interpreting Post,204 the legislation proposed in Part IV 
makes clear that offensive use of NCAs is prohibited.  
7. Brain Drain 
In addition to lower wage growth and lower initial 
wages, the 2016 OEP Report disclosed that stricter 
enforcement of NCAs is tied to “brain drain,” which is 
supported by data showing that highly skilled workers move 
from enforcing states to non-enforcing states.205 Silicon 
Valley is often cited as the “poster child” for economic growth 
in a strongly non-enforceable state.206 Analysts have 
suggested that because California does not generally enforce 
non-compete agreements, Silicon Valley benefited from 
“knowledge spillovers,” a byproduct of “rapid employee 
movement between employers and to startups.”207 This 
freedom of movement results in “brain-gain” for the non-
enforcing state and brain drain for the enforcing state.208 
Enforcing states suppress innovation because “knowledge 
 
 202. SIFCO Industs., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Tech., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 155, 
158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 203. Id. at 158–59. 
 204. See also Greystone Funding Corp. v. Kutner, 137 A.D.3d 427, 427 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2016) (calling attention to opposing holdings in Post and Wise); Griffith 
Practice Note, supra note 1 (recognizing disagreement by federal courts in 
interpreting New York’s position on termination without cause). 
 205. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 23. 
 206. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3–6. 
 207. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial 
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 575, 575 (1999). 
 208. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 860–61. 
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spillover” is reduced and diverted to other states.209 While 
brain drain may not be a problem in the realm of low wage, 
low-skilled workers, it is another potential cost associated 
with the use of NCAs because the agreements can have a 
negative impact on entrepreneurship and impede 
innovation.210  
IV. RECENT LITIGATION AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 
A. Using Existing Law to Investigate Violations of Law 
State Attorneys General (“A.G.s”) have taken an active 
role in identifying employment covenants that restrict a 
company’s ability to recruit or hire competitors’ 
employees.211 At least eight fast-food restaurants, notorious 
for hiring low-wage workers, are under investigation in ten 
states and the District of Columbia for their use of non-
compete and non-poaching agreements.212 The A.G.s are 
 
 209. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 861 (“The positive cycle appears 
geographically bound: worker mobility is a primary vehicle of knowledge 
spillovers, which in turn enhances regional innovation and growth, leading to 
increased opportunities and job mobility.”). 
 210. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 861. 
 211. Steve Sbraccia, Several States Investigating Non-Compete Clauses In 
Fast-Food Jobs, CBS (Updated July 13, 2018, 5:12 AM), https://www.cbs17.com/ 
news/investigators/several-states-investigating-non-complete-clauses-in-fast-
food-jobs/1298896501 [hereinafter “Non-Compete Clauses In Fast-Food Jobs”]; 
Michael L. Diamond, State Attorneys General Want to Know More About Fast-
Food ‘No Poach’ and Noncompete Agreements, USA TODAY NETWORK (July 9, 
2018, 6:37 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-now/2018/07/09/ 
fast-food-no-poach-agreements/769560002/. 
 212. Id.; see also Press Release, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, AG 
Grewal Seeks Records From Eight Fast Food Companies About Use of Employee 
Non-Compete Agreements (Jul 9, 2018), https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/ 
pr20180709a.html. Non-poaching agreements are agreements between 
businesses in which they agree not to hire or solicit each other’s employees. These 
agreements can raise antitrust issues “if they are not reasonably tailored to 
support a broader, legitimate business collaboration.” Kevin R. Miller & Colin A. 
Thakkar, State Attorneys General Step Up Antitrust Probes of Franchise Industry 
Hiring Practices, JACKSONLEWIS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.noncompete 
report.com/2018/08/state-attorneys-general-step-up-antitrust-probes-of-
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spearheading the investigations amid concerns for employee 
mobility as well as possible antitrust violations for the use of 
non-poaching agreements.213 
Another example of legal action by state A.G.s is the 
2016 settlement with Jimmy John’s, in which the New York 
and Illinois A.G.s obtained agreements from Jimmy John’s 
to halt the use of NCAs for their franchise employees.214 In 
2018, the New York and Illinois A.G.s coordinated their 
efforts to obtain a settlement with WeWork Companies, Inc., 
which released over 1,400 employees from their NCAs.215 
The agreements applied broadly to all employees regardless 
of job duties and access to confidential information and 
included cleaners, mail associates and baristas, some 
 
franchise-industry-hiring-practices/. For more discussion on non-poaching 
agreements, see Gauri Punjabi, Are Anti-Poaching Agreements Enforceable in 
New York? Not in the Absence of a Protectable Interest Says One New York Federal 
Court (Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.employmentmattersblog.com/2014/02/are-
anti-poaching-agreements-enforceable-in-new-york-not-in-the-absence-of-a-
protectable-interest-says-one-new-york-federal-court/ (last visited 11-13-18); Jeff 
John Robert, Tech Workers Will Get Average of $5,770 Under Final Anti-Poaching 
Settlement, FORTUNE (Sept. 3, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/03/koh-anti-
poach-order/ (discussing the trouble Adobe Systems, Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel 
Corp., Pixar, Lucasfilm, and Intuit ran into in using these agreements). 
 213. Kevin R. Miller & Colin A. Thakkar, State Attorneys General Step Up 
Antitrust Probes of Franchise Industry Hiring Practices, JACKSONLEWIS (Aug. 
22, 2018), https://www.noncompetereport.com/2018/08/state-attorneys-general-
step-up-antitrust-probes-of-franchise-industry-hiring-practices/; Michael L. 
Diamond, State Attorneys General Want to Know More About Fast-Food ‘No 
Poach’ and Noncompete Agreements, USA TODAY NETWORK (Jul 9, 2018 6:37 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-now/2018/07/09/fast-food-
no-poach-agreements/769560002/. 
 214. Jimmy John’s Drops Noncompete Clauses, supra note 7; Oppressive 
Noncompete Agreements, supra note 8; Rethinking Non-compete Agreements, 
supra note 4 at 66. NY BUS. JOURNAL, Jimmy John’s Settles Non-Compete Case 
with A.G.’s Office (June 22, 2016) https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/ 
2016/06/22/jimmy-johns-settles-non-compete-case-with-a-g.html. 
 215. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General’s Office, Attorney General 
Madigan Reaches Settlement with WeWork to End Use of Overly Broad Non-
Competes (Sept. 18, 2018), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/ 
2018_09/20180918.html. 
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making as little as $15/hour.216 
The New York State A.G. has secured additional 
settlements that have released employees from their NCAs. 
On August 4, 2016, the Attorney General announced a 
settlement with EMSI (Examination Management Service, 
Inc.) to cease use of non-competes for most of its New York 
employees.217 The agreements prohibited employees from 
working for a competitor located within fifty miles of any 
EMSI location at which the employee worked for a period of 
nine months after leaving EMSI.218 On June 15, 2016, the 
Attorney General announced a settlement with Law360, a 
subsidiary of LexisNexis, which required its editorial 
employees to sign non-competes that prevented them from 
working for any media outlet providing news for a period of 
one year.219 The A.G. was able to negotiate settlements by 
arguing that the agreements exceeded the scope of protection 
recognized by New York courts.220 Companies that attempt 
to protect interests that are not recognized as ‘legitimate’ run 
the risk of investigation by the A.G.  
Attorneys General across the U.S. have brokered the 
release of NCAs for thousands of employees and have 
 
 216. Press Release, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, supra note 212. 
 217. Mark Iandolo, EMSI to Stop Using Non-Compete Agreements in New York 
State, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Aug. 5, 2016), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/ 
510986488-emsi-to-stop-using-non-compete-agreements-in-new-york-state 
 218. Id. 
 219. Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, NY Attorney General Sends a Message: Re-
think Non-Compete Agreements, LEXOLOGY, (July 19, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=852495d7-7040-404c-a0cb-
d4610478c901. 
 220. Courts in the state require that terms be no greater in scope and duration 
than necessary to protect legitimate business interests, such as trade secrets and 
confidential information. Lisa C. Sullivan & Matthew T. McLaughlin, New York 
and Illinois AGs Crack Down on Use of Noncompetes in Settlement with WeWork 
and Release Guidance on Use of Noncompetes, NIXON PEABODY (Sept. 20, 
2018), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2018/09/20/new-york-and 
-illinois-ags-release-guidance-on-use-of-non-competes [hereinafter “New York 
and Illinois AG’s Crack Down”]. 
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conducted investigations into the illegal use of the 
agreements.221 This commitment should send a message to 
state legislatures and employers that the use of non-
competes should be limited to the protection of legitimate 
business interests and that failure to do so will result in legal 
action by state A.G.s. Unfortunately, A.G. offices lack the 
resources to uncover every violation of law in the state. 
Companies that have the foresight to restrict non-compete 
use to the protection of legitimate business interests can 
avoid legal scrutiny, but others use the agreements to bind 
all employees without consideration of protectable, 
legitimate business interests or include terms that are not 
limited in scope and duration. Such agreements run afoul of 
state laws that allow protection of only legitimate business 
interests and could trigger investigation or legal action. The 
fear of public backlash has certainly been useful in securing 
releases.222 However, investigating and exposing abuse takes 
time and employees can suffer severe financial consequences 
before help arrives on the scene. In addition, some companies 
may elect to roll the dice if the courts in their state reform 
unreasonable terms rather than void the agreement.  
B. Legislative Proposals 
1. Federal Level 
To date, action at the federal level against the use of 
 
 221. Non-Compete Clauses In Fast-Food Jobs, supra note 209; New York and 
Illinois AGs Crack Down, supra note 220. In 2019, NY A.G. James joined a multi-
state coalition of Attorneys General to reach a settlement in which Arby’s, 
Dunkin’, Five Guys and Little Caesars agreed to cease using non-poach 
agreements to restrict employee mobility. Press Release, New York Attorney 
General’s Office, Attorney General Letitia James Joins Multistate Settlement To 
Cease Fast Food Usage Of No-Poach Agreements, (Mar. 12, 2019). 
 222. E.g., Robert M. Isackson, Backlash Against Jimmy John’s Non-Compete 
Agreement Highlights Risks of Overzealous Business Protection Measures, 
MONDAQ (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/365698/Trade 
+Secrets/Backlash+Against+Jimmy+Johns+NonCompete+Agreement+Highligh
ts+Risks+Of+Overzealous+Business+Protection+Measures. 
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employment restraints has been in the form of presidential 
recommendations and proposed legislation. While 
employment contract law is one area that has traditionally 
been left to the states, “that fact alone does not immunize 
state employment laws from preemption if Congress in fact 
contemplated preemption.”223 
Recent non-compete legislative proposals do not contain 
preemption clauses and may allow the states to regulate non-
competes as well. In 2015, Senate Bill 1504, the Mobility and 
Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act was 
introduced to prohibit the use of non-competes for low-wage 
workers and establish rules requiring disclosure to 
prospective employees prior to employment. However, the 
bill failed after being introduced in the Senate.224 The 
attention on non-competes was not lost on the Obama White 
House and the administration advocated for legislation to 
limit or ban the agreements.225 
Senate Bill 2782, the Workplace Mobility Act of 2018, 
was introduced to create a nationwide ban prohibiting any 
company engaged in interstate commerce from requiring its 
employees to execute non-compete agreements.226 The bill 
 
 223. Dilts v. Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 643 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 224. MOVE Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015). The bill defined low wage 
employees as making less than $15/hour or $31,200.00 annually. 
 225. Id. The administration published Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of 
the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses in May, 2016 in an effort to 
“identify policies that could be used to promote a fair and dynamic labor market.” 
3, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report 
_final2.pdf. In addition, the administration called the states to action, 
encouraging the states to pass reformative legislation banning non-competes for 
specific categories of workers, improving transparency of use, and incentivizing 
employers to write enforceable contracts. Christopher Steif, Senators Introduce 
Bill for Nationwide Non-Compete Ban, FISHER PHILLIPS (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-and-Trade-Secrets/senators-
introduce-bill-for-nationwide-ban-on-non-competes, citing State Call to Action on 
Non-Competes, (October 25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/competition/noncompetes-calltoaction-final.pdf. 
 226. Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2018), 
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would allow the Secretary of Labor to investigate and 
prosecute violations and impose civil fines up to $5,000.00. 
In addition, a private right of action would be established 
and the ability to contractually protect trade secrets would 
be preserved.227 
 On January 15, 2019, Senator Marco Rubio introduced 
S.124, otherwise known as The Freedom to Compete Act. 228  
The Bill proposes an amendment the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938, and would retroactively eliminate the use of non-
compete agreements for certain non-exempt employees.229  
The state-to-state disparity of enforceability of NCAs 
argues in favor of federal legislation resolving the issue.230 
However, the flat ban in the 2017 version of the MOVE Act 
hurts businesses because it abandons the defense of 
legitimate business interests currently recognized by state 
courts. For example, New York courts currently permit non-
competes if they are intended to provide: (1) protection from 
competition by a former employee whose services are unique 
or extraordinary; (2) protection against the misappropriation 
of trade secrets or confidential customer lists; and (3) 
protection against appropriating the goodwill of clients or 
customers.231 Courts in Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, 
 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2782/text?r=6; see also 
Christopher Steif, Senators Introduce Bill for Nationwide Non-Compete Ban, 
FISHER PHILLIPS (May 14, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/Non-Compete-
and-Trade-Secrets/senators-introduce-bill-for-nationwide-ban-on-non-competes. 
The House version of the bill is H.R. 5631. 
 227. Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2782/text?r=6. 
 228. Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Congress (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/124. This Bill remains 
in Committee at the time this Paper was re-submitted. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Driving Performance, supra note 2, at 839–41 (discussing the varied court 
interpretations and the uncertainty that results). 
 231. BDO Seidman, 93 N.Y.2d at 389–93; Beck’s State By State Survey, supra 
note 45. 
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Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin permit non-competes if they 
are intended to provide (1) protection against the 
misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential 
information; and (2) protection of customer relationships.232 
A flat ban on non-competes disregards the states’ recognized 
protectable business interests. 
Moreover, the proposed federal legislation’s one-size-fits-
all approach fails to address the diversity and unique needs 
of the states, which is better left to the individual states to 
determine through their state-level elected officials. In 
contrast, the 2015 MOVE Act that bans non-competes for low 
wage workers would be a better place to start by providing 
protection to all low wage workers country-wide and 
removing any disparity that is currently present between the 
states. 
Another suggestion for federal legislation would be a bill 
that creates general rules for use of NCAs, such as required 
disclosure during the application process and a prohibition 
of enforcement against employees terminated without cause. 
Nevertheless, it is this author’s opinion that, given the 
diversity among the socio-economic landscapes of the states, 
state legislators are in the best position to define a low wage 
worker and design legislation that reflects the needs of the 
state and the best interests of their constituents.233 
2. State Level 
Recent public exposure of non-compete misuse has 
encouraged state legislators to introduce bills banning or 
placing limitations and restrictions on their use. As 
 
 232. Beck’s State By State Survey, supra note 45. 
 233. For example, in their article Non-Compete Clauses in Physician 
Employment Contracts are Bad for Our Health, Hazel Beh and Ramsey Ross 
discuss the unique issue faced by Hawaii in recruiting and retaining physicians, 
such as the high cost of living in Hawaii and the geographic isolation of the state. 
Hazel G. Beh & Ramsey Ross, Non-Compete Clauses in Physician Employment 
Contracts are Bad for Our Health, 14 Hawaii Bar J. 79, 90 (2011).  
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previously discussed, both Massachusetts and Illinois have 
recently passed non-compete laws. The 2018 Massachusetts 
law carries a requirement that the non-compete agreement 
be presented at the time the offer of employment is made. 
Further, it requires “fair and reasonable consideration 
independent from the continuation of employment,” when 
the non-compete is signed after employment. These 
provisions promote transparency and require some benefit to 
the employee in exchange for signing the contract. The 
Massachusetts law also wisely prohibits non-competes for 
employees who do not likely encounter trade secrets or 
confidential information: employees under 18 years old and 
students engaged in short-term employment. In addition, the 
law prohibits enforcement against an employee terminated 
without cause, which limits an employer to defensive use 
rather than offensive use of the agreement. Nonetheless, 
there is no prohibition against the use of non-competes in the 
low-wage sector. 
While the 2016 Illinois Freedom to Work Act prohibits 
non-competes for low-wage workers, it is not nearly as 
comprehensive as the Massachusetts law and does not 
contemplate any other class of vulnerable worker, nor 
establish rules for use in other sectors that could promote 
transparency.234 The Act provides protection to low-wage 
earners but goes no further. That said, it smartly limits 
coverage to employees making minimum wage. Expanding 
the income threshold beyond the low-wage sector is a 
dangerous proposition to businesses trying to protect 
legitimate interests. While the low-wage income threshold 
may seem arbitrary, workers in this sector are not likely to 
possess specialized skills or have access to trade secrets or 
confidential client information. If an employer has a 
legitimate business interest to protect, it will have to offer a 
salary in excess of the minimum wage. 
 
 234. Illinois Freedom to Work Act, 2015 Ill. Laws 860 (effective Jan. 1, 2017). 
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In other states, bills have been introduced but have not 
become law. Pennsylvania introduced a series of bills in the 
2017 session, one of which would ban non-competes entirely, 
another that would ban them for low wage workers, and 
another that would ban them for health care workers.235 In 
2018, Vermont introduced a bill to prohibit non-compete 
agreements with some narrow exceptions.236 New Jersey 
reintroduced a bill in 2018 that places limitations on 
restrictive covenants and contains employee exempt 
classifications.237 In 2015, New York Assemblyman Jeffrey 
Dinowitz introduced a bill banning the use of non-competes 
for low wage workers.238 The bill, known as the Mobility and 
Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees (MOVE) Act targeted 
employees making less than $15.00 an hour, but it never 
reached a vote.239 
In January 2017, New York Senator Diane Savino re-
introduced the “MOVE Act” as S4610, a bill prohibiting 
employers from requiring low-wage employees to enter into 
non-compete agreements.240 A low wage employee was 
 
 235. Pennsylvania H.B. 1938, (2017), would prohibit non-compete agreements 
and provides for an award of attorneys’ fees and punitive damages to the 
prevailing employee, (http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm? 
sYear=2017&sInd=0&body=h&type=b&bn=1938), while H.B. 1590 (2017) would 
prohibit non-compete agreements for low wage workers and imposes penalties in 
the form of fines (http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?s 
Year=2017&sInd=0&body=h&type=b&bn=1590), and H.B. 788 (2017) would 
prohibit non-competes in health care practitioner employment agreements 
(http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?sYear=2017&sInd=0&b
ody=h&type=b&bn=788). 
 236. H.B. 556, (2018), (https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/status/2018/ 
H.%20556). 
 237. A. 1769, S. 2872, 2018 Leg., 218th Sess. (N.J. 2018), reintroduced from 
last session proposed bills A. 5261, S. 3518, https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
2018/Bills/A2000/1769_I1.PDF.  
 238. A. 8108, S. 6797, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2015/a8108/amendment/original. 
 239. A. 8108, S. 6797, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2015/a8108/amendment/original. 
 240. S. 4610, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
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defined as an employee who, excluding overtime 
compensation, makes the greater of (1) $15 per hour; or (2) 
state or local minimum wage; or (3) an annual compensation 
that is equal to or less than $31,200.00.241 The bill was 
introduced in the Assembly by Assemblyman Dinowitz under 
A1139, but died in committee.242 
In June 2017, Senator Catharine Young introduced 
S6554, a bill amending the labor law to prohibit the use of 
noncompete agreements for employees earning less than 
$75,000.00 per year.243 The bill was also introduced in the 
Assembly by Assemblyman Dinowitz,244 but it was never 
voted on.245 For employees making more than $75,000.00, 
the bills required agreements to be in writing and signed by 
both employer and employee.246 In addition, the bill would 
require employers to provide non-compete agreements to 
employees by the earlier of an offer of employment or thirty 
 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s4610/amendment/original. 
 241. S. 4610, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s4610/amendment/original; By the end of 2018, the 
minimum wage for NYC fast food workers and hospitality food service employees 
at businesses with 11 or more employees will be $15.00, which, at 40 hours/week 
translates to $31,200.00. https://www3.swipeclock.com/blog/minimum-wage-
changes-2018-state-state-guide/. 
 242. S. 4610, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/A1139. 
 243. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554. 
 244. A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. 
 245. A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. See also Judah L. Rosenblatt’s 
article discussing the New York City legislation introduced that targets low wage 
workers and implements rules for use in other sectors. Which States are Likely to 
Enact Laws Restricting Non-Compete Agreements in 2018?, THE NATIONAL LAW 
REVIEW, (Feb. 8, 2018) https://www.natlawreview.com/article/which-states-are-
likely-to-enact-laws-restricting-non-compete-agreements-2018. 
 246. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. 
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days before the agreement effective date.247 If a current 
employee is not bound by a non-compete, his or her employer 
would be required to provide notice at least thirty days before 
the effective date of the agreement.248 Significantly, the bill 
provides that if an employee subject to a non-compete is 
discharged without cause, the non-compete is no longer 
enforceable.249 The provision resolves the current state of 
uncertainty in New York courts regarding the use of non-
competes as a sword rather than a shield. Unfortunately, 
New York’s proposed law, S6554, setting the threshold at 
$75,000.00, is simply too heavy handed and is far more likely 
to prevent employers from protecting legitimate business 
interests. 250 
3. Pros and Cons of Current Initiatives 
There are some protections in both enacted and proposed 
legislation that promote transparency and the protection of 
only legitimate business interests. Industry-specific laws 
and initiatives can address local needs or preserve valued 
rights. For example, laws prohibiting non-competes in the 
broadcasting sector promote free speech and public access to 
news. Restrictions on use in the healthcare sector ensure 
availability of medical treatment and providers. Prohibitions 
in technology fields promote innovation and knowledge 
spillover. However, the decision to protect certain industries 
 
 247. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. 
 248. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. 
 249. S. 6554, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate 
.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s6554; A. 7864A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/a7864/amendment/a. 
 250. Since submission of this Paper, Assemblyman Dinowitz re-introduced the 
Bill under A 7193, which currently remains on the Floor Calendar. A. 7193A, 
2019 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/ 
2019/A7193. 
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should be left to the individual states that can best determine 
how to protect their citizens. 
Federal Trade Commission rulemaking would be 
consistent with Congress’ goal that the FTC define and 
identify “unfair methods of competition.” FTC guidance and 
rulemaking relative to NCAs, especially their use in the low 
wage sector, could prove very helpful in putting employers 
on notice of what constitutes an unfair method of 
competition. It would also provide information that is 
currently lacking because of the lack of adjudication and 
judicial guidance in this area. However, there is no private 
cause of action under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which 
prohibits unfair methods of competition, leaving 
enforcement in the hands of the FTC or attorneys general.251 
If an employee has the funds and motivation to 
commence an action against an employer or defend against 
one, case-by-case adjudication can lead to unpredictable 
results because judges must apply complex standards and 
balancing tests. This results in disparate rulings that make 
it difficult for employees to predict whether they will succeed 
on the merits. In addition, the expense and protracted nature 
of litigation could dissuade employees from commencing 
such actions. 
4. Legislative Proposal for New York State 
Notwithstanding the variety of proposed and active 
legislation and initiatives, protections against the improper 
use of non-competes in the low wage sector are severely 
inadequate in New York State. While there are arguments 
that NCAs can lead to more training opportunities,252 many 
positions in the low wage sector simply do not involve the 
kind of costly training contemplated by employers of highly 
 
 251. FTC Act Section 5: Overview, Practical Law Practice Note Overview 7-
586-7865 (Westlaw) (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
 252. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 3. 
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skilled, educated, and compensated employees. Nor do such 
positions involve services that are unique or extraordinary, 
trade secrets, or confidential information that would justify 
the use of the agreement. In other words, in the low-wage 
sector, there is simply no risk of unfair competition sufficient 
to warrant the use of NCAs. Any proposed legislation should 
prohibit non-competes for low-wage workers while reserving 
rights of employers to protect trade secrets, confidential 
client information, and investments in innovation and highly 
specialized training in other income brackets. The legislation 
should clarify that controlling turnover costs is not a 
protectable legitimate business interest in any income 
bracket. 
It is true that permissive use of NCAs is reflective of the 
traditional respect for the right to contract. Theoretically, if 
the parties agree to an NCA , their contract should indicate 
an intent to be bound and a meeting of the minds. However, 
the playing field is not always level, particularly for low wage 
workers, and the parties do not all have equal negotiating 
power. Studies show that the majority of workers presented 
with a non-compete do not negotiate the terms of the 
agreement.253 Many employees sign non-competes because 
they believe the terms are reasonable, assume the terms are 
not negotiable, don’t want to create tension with their new 
employer, are afraid of being terminated,254 or didn’t think 
the agreement would be enforced after taking a new job.255 
In most cases, jobs in the lower wage sector come with take-
it-or-leave-it terms and are not open to negotiation.256  
Evan Starr’s research has also shown that in many 
cases, the agreements were not presented until the first day 
 
 253. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 19. 
 254. Id. at 19, 45. 
 255. Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, supra note 5, at 45. 
 256. Id. at 19 (61.6% of respondents believed that they had no choice but to 
sign and would not have been hired without the non-compete). 
D56 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
 
of employment or later.257 When NCAs are not discussed or 
disclosed at the interview stage, the lack of transparency 
leaves employees at the mercy of the new employer with few 
or no good options.258 This failure to disclose could be 
tempered by requiring non-competes to be disclosed during 
the interview process or no later than at the time of a job 
offer. However, such a requirement could be difficult to police 
and enforce. Offering a waiting period for a prospective 
employee to consider the terms before taking the job is also 
a possibility, but this may delay the hiring process for the 
employer and could be quite costly when time is lost waiting 
to bring a new hire on board. Nevertheless, proposed 
legislation should contain a notice provision allowing current 
and prospective employees a short time to consider any 
rights they may be forfeiting by signing a non-compete. 
Even if trade secrets or confidential information and 
client lists were involved, New York courts require that 
employment restraints be no greater than necessary to 
protect the employer’s legitimate interests. It may be 
possible to protect such interests by using a more limited 
restraint that does not restrict postemployment 
opportunities.259 For example, a Confidentiality or 
Nondisclosure Agreement, may accomplish the employer’s 
objective of preventing the disclosure of confidential and 
proprietary information.260 If an employer is concerned with 
losing clients, a Non-Solicitation or Nondealing Agreement 
might address the issue by prohibiting an employee from 
 
 257. Id. at 45 (nearly 30% of respondents were presented with the non-compete 
after accepting the job offer). 
 258. Id. at 18 (26% of those presented with agreement after taking the job 
would have thought twice about accepting the position). 
 259. Griffith Practice Note, supra note 1 (discussing use of alternatives to non-
competes in the form of non-solicit, non-poaching, and confidentiality 
agreements, as well as garden leave and assignment of invention agreements). 
 260. Susan M. Heathfield, Confidentiality Agreement, How Does a 
Confidentiality Agreement Affect the Employment Relationship?, THE BALANCE 
(Jan. 6 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/confidentiality-agreement-1918086. 
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soliciting his or her former employer’s clients after taking a 
new job.261 Again, this type of agreement would offer 
protection to the employer while maintaining the employee’s 
freedom of movement.262 Each of these agreements, like non-
competes, must be reasonable in scope, necessary to 
legitimate business interests, not harmful to the public and 
not unreasonably burdensome on the employee.263 
In addition, New York courts allow restraints provided 
they do not impose undue hardship on the employee and are 
not injurious to the public. Preventing a low wage employee 
from working in his or her area of expertise could impose 
hardship by forcing the employee to take a position outside 
his or her skill set that pays much less. Using the example of 
the health care aide, not only would restraining 
postemployment opportunities hurt the employee, it would 
also injure the community by depriving patients of necessary 
medical care. While there is much focus on determining 
legitimate business interests, attention should be paid to 
employee hardship and injury to the public. 
One could argue that since New York is a highly 
unenforceable state, or because New York courts are willing 
to reform contract terms, there’s no harm in maintaining the 
status quo. However, leaving resolution solely to the courts 
is an inefficient solution. First, the lack of litigated cases 
involving low wage workers indicates that unreasonable and 
unenforceable non-competes in the low wage sector are not 
 
 261. Jean Murray, Non-Solicitation Agreements in Business Contracts, THE 
BALANCE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/non-solicitation-
agreements-in-business-contracts-398359. 
 262. The drawback here is that once the agreement is violated, judicial relief 
may come too late and the employer may have already suffered a loss. It would 
be necessary for employers to move quickly for injunctive relief to mitigate any 
losses and demand payment for damages. 
 263. Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Altair Invests. NA, 59 A.D.3d 97, 102 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008); TBA Global, LLC v. Proscenium Events, LLC, 114 A.D.3d 571, 572 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Transunion Holding Co., 2014 WL 
97317, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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being adjudicated in court, in part because employers have 
no intention of taking legal action and use the agreements 
for their chilling effect. Further, employees lack the funds to 
defend against or commence a lawsuit making them inclined 
to settlements. Secondly, because New York courts are 
willing to reform contract terms, employees will have 
difficulty predicting judicial outcomes and determining if 
litigation is worth the cost, time, and trouble. Judicial 
outcomes are also uncertain because there appears to be 
some disagreement in interpreting Post.264 Therefore, 
proposed legislation should make clear that NCAs cannot be 
used offensively against employees terminated without 
cause.265 
In sum, proposed legislation should allow businesses to 
protect legitimate interests while preserving employment 
mobility in the low wage sector. A bill targeting low-wage 
and other particularly vulnerable workers could: 
(1) give employees leverage to negotiate better wages because they 
are not tied to their employer; 
(2) allow for wage growth and better benefit packages because more 
employees are competing for the same position, which in turn leads 
to increased job satisfaction and lower turnover; 
(3) protect vulnerable categories of workers, such as school-aged 
children, young adults and recent graduates; 
(4) prevent employers from failing to disclose non-competes until a 
 
 264. See also Greystone Funding Corp. v. Kutner, 137 A.D.3d 427, 427 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2016) (calling attention to opposing holdings Post and Wise); Griffith 
Practice Note, supra note 1 (recognizing disagreement by federal courts in 
interpreting New York’s position on termination without cause). 
 265. “The general rule [in New York] is that restrictive covenants may be 
enforced against former employees terminated ‘without cause’ provided that the 
employer had not materially breached the contract containing the restrictive 
covenant and provided the covenant passes the ‘reasonable’ tests traditionally 
applied in cases where employees voluntarily quit and engage in forbidden 
competitive activities.” Peter L. Altieri & David J. Clark, After Termination 
“Without Cause”: Restrictive Covenants, (Feb. 8, 2007), https://www.ebglaw.com/ 
news/after-termination-without-cause-restrictive-covenants/. 
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job offer has been accepted; 
(5) prevent employers from using non-competes offensively in 
combination with the right to terminate an employee at-will; 
(6) place all qualified available candidates in the job pool allowing 
employers to hire the best candidate; 
(7) increase the availability of experienced workers which allows 
employers to avoid paying training costs that they may not recoup; 
(8) ensure employees have the freedom to control their professional 
careers and improve their personal lives; 
(9) encourage judicial efficiency and prevent litigation that 
attempts to protect an interest not recognized by New York courts 
as a legitimate business interest; 
(10) discourage workers from leaving the state to move into other 
non-enforcing states;266 
(11) reduce the chilling effect that NCAs can have on employees who 
are threatened with enforcement and cannot afford or do not wish 
to defend a lawsuit; 
(12) prevent employers from attempting or threatening to litigate 
an agreement that is unenforceable because it does not protect a 
legitimate business interest; 
(13) reduce the possibility that critical services will be unavailable 
to consumers; 
(14) reduce or eliminate unjust enrichment resulting from 
overcompensation for training costs recouped in full before 
termination; 
(15) prohibit the enforcement of non-compete agreements against 
employees fired without cause; 
(16) protect employees by requiring additional consideration for 
non-compete agreements required after employment has 
commenced; 
(17) be consistent with the basic tenets of competition and 
 
 266. Although New York is on the lowest end of the enforcement spectrum, 
interviewees may not want to risk the possibility of legal action and, instead, may 
elect to move to a state that does not enforce non-competes in their sector at all 
or has legal protections already in place that guarantee early disclosure. 
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capitalism by prohibiting employers from depriving competing 
firms of qualified candidates; and 
(18) reduce the number of low wage out-of-work employees on public 
assistance due to an inability to find suitable employment in their 
field. 
To that end, the bill I propose for New York is based on 
the bills previously introduced in New York State as well as 
the recent law passed in Massachusetts. I include what I 
consider to be the best provisions of each: (1) prohibiting use 
of non-compete agreements for low wage workers as well as 
workers under the age of 18, students, and employees 
terminated without cause or laid off; (2) establishing notice 
and disclosure requirements for all other employees; (3) 
defining protectable legitimate business interests that allow 
for the protection of trade secrets, confidential information, 
and client relationships and unique skills acquired at the 
employer’s expenses; (4) providing an enforcement 
mechanism under the New York State Department of Labor; 
and (5) providing a private cause of action for employees. The 
proposed bill and explanatory memorandum follow the 
conclusion of this paper. 
CONCLUSION 
Non-competes can serve a useful purpose in protecting 
companies from unfair competition and have a place in 
highly skilled and compensated sectors where employees 
perform unique services or where the loss of trade secrets, 
confidential information, or client relationships are 
legitimate business concerns. However, “when entry level 
workers at fast food restaurants are asked to sign two-year 
non-competes, it becomes less plausible that legitimate 
business interests are the primary motivation for such 
agreements.”267 Although employees can pursue legal 
remedies, they need the resources and motivation to take 
 
 267. OEP Report, supra note 5, at 11. 
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legal action and must be willing to accept the consequences 
of such action on future employment opportunities. 
When non-competes are misused, they become a sword 
against individual freedom and fair trade, rather than a 
shield against unfair competition. “Indeed, our economy is 
premised on the competition engendered by the uninhabited 
flow of service, talent and ideas.”268 If employers wish to 
control the flow of talent by reducing turnover, they should 
not rely on an NCA to accomplish that goal. Instead, 
employers can offer incentives such as quarterly bonuses and 
paid time off to reward longevity and reduce turnover. They 
can improve work environments, eliminate hostility, and 
promote a culture of mutual respect. Employers should not 
be permitted to use NCAs in tandem with at-will 
employment or take the easy way out by using non-competes 
to tie employees to a job, rather than invest in programs that 
encourage employee longevity and loyalty. When used 
properly, Nondisclosure and Non-Solicitation Agreements 
can protect employers’ legitimate business interests while 
promoting fair and free trade, encouraging innovation, and 
maintaining respect for low wage earners’ rights to control 
their destiny. 
 
 268. Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976). 
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APPENDIX A. LEGISLATIVE MEMORANDUM FOR PROPOSED BILL 
Legislative Memorandum 
The following legislation should be introduced to 
promote free market competition and employee mobility in 
New York State. Non-compete agreements have been used in 
employment relationships that do not involve legitimate 
business interests recognized by the courts in this State: 
protecting trade secrets, confidential client information or 
relationships, or unique and specialized skills. This is 
evident from detailed study evidence, extensive scholarly 
writings, existing case law, and the numerous settlements 
obtained by the New York State Attorney General. The 
Legislature should take steps to protect employees from the 
illegitimate use of non-compete agreements. This proposed 
bill can do that. 
Employees frequently sign non-competes. The 
prevalence of postemployment restraints prevents 
businesses from hiring the best possible candidates and 
prevents employees from controlling their livelihoods, 
improving their lives, and maximizing their talents. 
Depriving employees of these choices hurts the economy and 
free market competition. 
This legislation protects employees from illegitimate 
non-compete use while allowing businesses to guard against 
unfair competition. It prohibits non-compete agreements for 
employees age 18 and under, employees terminated without 
cause, students who participate in an internship or other 
short-term employment, and low wage workers. In doing so, 
the proposed legislation resolves any real or perceived 
judicial inconsistency in the state regarding non-compete use 
when an employee is terminated without cause. 
In addition, in cases where non-compete agreements are 
permissible, the proposed legislation creates rules of use, 
which require non-competes to be presented in writing 
during the interview process and grant candidates time to 
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consider the terms of the agreement. If a current employee is 
asked to sign a non-compete, he or she will have at least 30 
days before the agreement becomes effective and is entitled 
to separate consideration independent of continued 
employment. 
The proposed legislation requires that permissible non-
compete agreements be no broader in scope and duration 
than necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate business 
interests, which are limited to the protection of trade secrets 
and confidential information, protection against the 
appropriation of client relationships formed at the 
employer’s expense, and protection against competition by a 
former employee whose unique and extraordinary skills were 
acquired at the employer’s expense. 
Finally, the proposed legislation creates an enforcement 
mechanism, granting the New York State Commissioner of 
Labor the power to investigate and prosecute violations of 
law. In the event the commissioner elects not to prosecute a 
claim, individual rights to sue are granted. This provision 
gives injured employees an administrative remedy that does 
not require them to hire counsel and pay attorneys’ fees. 
While the proposed bill does not currently include a section 
for funding this enforcement mechanism, it is presumed that 
the bill is contingent on the legislature adopting language 
that provides the funding necessary to carry out this 
initiative. 
The proposed legislation acknowledges that employees 
in some sectors should be protected from non-compete use 
altogether and that other employees are entitled to certain 
protections regarding the permissible use of non-competes. It 
respects the right of employers to protect legitimate business 
interests. It will have a positive impact on New York’s 
economy by spurring innovation and competition, while 
respecting contract rights. 
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APPENDIX B. PROPOSED BILL 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
_______________________________________________________ 
AN ACT to amend the labor law, prohibiting employers 
from requiring covered employees to enter into covenants not 
to compete and imposing disclosure and consideration 
requirements for non-covered employees. 
 
Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
“New York State mobility and opportunity for vulnerable 
employees act” or the “NY MOVE act”. 
 
Section 2. The labor law is amended by adding a new article 
33 to read as follows: 
ARTICLE 33 
NEW YORK STATE MOBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY FOR 
VULNERABLE EMPLOYEES ACT 
Section 950. Definitions. 
Section 951. Prohibiting covenants not to compete for Covered 
Employees 
Section 952. Disclosure requirement for covenants not to compete. 
Section 953. Enforcement. 
 
Section 950. Definitions. For purposes of this article, the following 
terms shall have the following meanings: 
1. “Commerce” has the meaning given such term in section three 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 203). 
2. “Covenant not to compete” means an agreement or clause 
contained in an employment contract: 
(a) between an employee and employer that prohibits or 
restricts such employee from performing: 
(i) any work for another employer for a specified period 
of time; 
(ii) any work in a specified geographical area; or 
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(iii) work for another employer that is similar to such 
employee’s work for the employer included as a party 
to the agreement; and 
(b) that is entered into after the effective date of this article; 
(c) that does not include: 
(i) covenants not to solicit employees of the employer; 
(ii) covenants not to solicit or transact business with 
customers clients, or vendors of the employer; 
(iii) noncompetition agreements made in connection with 
the sale of a business entity or partnership, or 
otherwise disposing of the ownership interest of a 
business entity or partnership (or division or 
subsidiary thereof), when the party restricted by the 
noncompetition agreement is a significant owner of, 
or member or partner in, the business entity who will 
receive significant consideration or benefit from the 
sale or disposal; 
(iv) noncompetition agreements outside of an 
employment relationship; 
(v) nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements; 
3. “Covered Employee”: 
(a) means 
(i) any employee age 18 years or younger; 
(ii) any employee who has been laid off or terminated 
without cause; 
(iii) undergraduate or graduate students who partake in 
an internship or other short-term employment 
relationship, whether paid or unpaid, while enrolled 
in a full-time or part-time undergraduate or graduate 
institution; 
(iv) any employee who, excluding any overtime 
compensation required under section seven of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 207) or 
under an applicable state law, receives from the 
applicable employer: 
(A) an hourly compensation that is less than the 
livable hourly rate, as defined in subdivision 5 of 
this section, or 
(B) an annual compensation that is equal to or less 
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than: 
1) for the fiscal year of the effective date of this 
article, thirty-one thousand two hundred 
dollars per year; and 
2) for each succeeding fiscal year, the adjusted 
amount described in subdivision three of 
section nine hundred fifty-one of this article; 
and 
(b) does not include: 
(i) any salaried employee who receives from the 
applicable employer compensation that, for two 
consecutive months, is greater than: 
(A) for the fiscal year of the effective date of this 
article, five thousand dollars; and 
(B) for each succeeding fiscal year, the adjusted 
amount described in subdivision three of section 
nine hundred fifty-one of this article. 
4. “Employee”, “employer”, “enterprise”, “enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”, and 
“goods” have the meanings given such terms in section three of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 203). 
5. “Livable hourly rate” means: 
(a) for the fiscal year of the effective date of this article, the 
greater of: 
(i) fifteen dollars per hour; or 
(ii) the hourly rate equal to the minimum wage required 
by the applicable state or local minimum wage law; 
and 
(b) for each succeeding fiscal year, the greater of: 
(i) the adjusted amount described in subdivision three of 
section nine hundred fifty-one of this article; or 
(ii) the hourly rate equal to the minimum wage required 
by the applicable state or local minimum wage law. 
6. “Misappropriation” means: 
(a) an act of acquisition of a trade secret of another by a 
person who knows or who has reason to know that the 
trade secret was acquired by improper means; or 
(b) an act of disclosure or of use of a trade secret of another 
without that person’s express or implied consent by a 
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person who 
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the 
trade secret or 
(ii) at the time of the actor’s disclosure or use, knew or 
had reason to know that the actor’s knowledge of the 
trade secret was 
(A) derived from or through a person who had 
utilized improper means to acquire it; 
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a 
duty to limit its acquisition, disclosure, or use; or 
(C) derived from or through a person who owed a 
duty to the person seeking relief to limit its 
acquisition, disclosure, or use; or 
(iii) before a material change of the actor’s position, knew 
or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and 
that the actor’s knowledge of it had been acquired by 
accident, mistake, or through another person’s act 
described in subsections 6(a) or (6)(b)(i) or (ii). 
7. “Trade Secret” means specified or specifiable information, 
whether or not fixed in tangible form or embodied in any 
tangible thing, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, 
business strategy, customer list, invention, or scientific, 
technical, financial or customer data that 
(a) at the time of the alleged misappropriation, provided 
economic advantage, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable 
by proper means by, others who might obtain economic 
advantage from its acquisition, disclosure or use; and 
(b) at the time of the alleged misappropriation was the 
subject of efforts that were reasonable under the 
circumstances, which may include reasonable notice, to 
protect against it being acquired, disclosed or used 
without the consent of the person properly asserting 
rights therein or such person’s predecessor in interest. 
 
Section 951. Prohibiting covenants not to compete for Covered 
Employees 
1. A covenant not to compete shall not be entered into by any 
employer with any Covered Employee of such employer, who in 
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any work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce (or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce). 
2. An employer who employs any Covered Employee, who in any 
work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods 
for commerce (or is employed in an enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce), shall 
post notice of the provisions of this article in a conspicuous 
place on the premises of such employer. 
3. (a) For each fiscal year after the fiscal year of the effective date 
of this article, the commissioner shall adjust each amount in 
effect under 
(i) subparagraph (i) of paragraph (b) of subdivision five 
of section nine hundred fifty of this article, 
(ii) subsection (2) of clause (B) of subparagraph (iv) of 
paragraph (a) of subdivision three of section nine 
hundred fifty of this article, or 
(iii) clause (A) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (b) of 
subdivision three of section nine hundred fifty of this 
article for inflation by increasing each such amount, 
as in effect for the preceding fiscal year, by the annual 
percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for 
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (United 
States city average, all items, not seasonally 
adjusted), or its successor publication, as determined 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(b) The amounts adjusted under paragraph (a) of this 
subdivision shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of 
$0.05. 
 
Section 952. Disclosure requirement for covenants not to compete. 
In order for an employer to require an employee, who in any work 
week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce 
(or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 
production of goods for commerce) and is not a Covered Employee, to 
enter into a covenant not to compete, the covenant must meet the 
following requirements: 
(a) It shall be provided to a prospective employee by the 
earlier of a formal offer of employment or thirty days 
before the non-compete -agreement goes into effect. 
(b) It shall be provided to a current employee: 
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(i) at least thirty days before the agreement becomes 
effective and 
(ii) be supported by fair and reasonable consideration 
independent from continued employment; 
(c) It shall be in writing and signed by the employer and 
employee; 
(d) It shall expressly state that the employee has the right to 
consult with counsel prior to signing. 
(e) It must be no broader in scope and duration than 
necessary to protect one or more of the following limited 
legitimate business interests: 
(i) the employer’s trade secrets; 
(ii) the employer’s confidential information that 
otherwise would not qualify as a trade secret; 
(iii) the appropriation of clients serviced by a former 
employee where the relationship was created and 
maintained at the employer’s expense; 
(iv) competition by a former employee whose services are 
unique or extraordinary and whose unique and 
extraordinary skills were acquired at the employer’s 
expense; 
(f) It must not impose an undue hardship on the employee; 
(g) It must not be injurious to the public; 
 
Section 953. Enforcement. 
1. The commissioner of labor shall have the power to receive, 
investigate, attempt to resolve, and enforce a complaint of a 
violation of sections nine hundred fifty-one and nine hundred 
fifty-two of this article, subject to subdivision two of this 
section. 
2. (a) The commissioner shall impose a civil fine: 
(i) on any employer who violates subdivision one of 
section nine hundred fifty-one or section nine 
hundred fifty-two of this article, an amount not to 
exceed five thousand dollars for each employee who 
was the subject of such violation; and 
(ii) with respect to any employer who violates 
subdivision two of section nine hundred fifty-one of 
this article, an amount not to exceed five thousand 
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dollars. 
(b) In determining the amount of any civil fine under this 
section, the commissioner shall consider the 
appropriateness of the fine to the size of the employer 
subject to such fine and the gravity of the applicable 
violation. 
3. (a) In the event the commissioner elects not to enforce a 
complaint of a violation of sections nine hundred fifty-one and 
nine hundred fifty-two of this article, an employee, including a 
Covered Employee, may bring a civil action in a court of 
competent jurisdiction against any employer or persons alleged 
to have violated this section. 
(b) An employee shall bring such action within two years of 
the later of: 
(i) when the prohibited non-compete agreement was 
signed; 
(ii) when the employee learns of the prohibited non-
compete agreement; 
(iii) when the employment relationship is terminated; or 
(iv) when the employer takes any step to enforce the non-
compete agreement. 
(c) The court shall have jurisdiction to void any such non-
compete agreement and to order all appropriate relief, 
including enjoining the conduct of any person or 
employer; ordering payment of liquidated damages; and 
awarding lost compensation, damages, reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and costs. 
(d) For the purposes of this subdivision, liquidated damages 
shall be calculated as an amount not more than ten 
thousand dollars. The court shall award liquidated 
damages to every employee affected under this section, in 
addition to any other remedies permitted by this section. 
(e) The court shall also award a consideration payment if the 
employer did not provide such payment when due. 
4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to employees 
covered under section two hundred two-k of this chapter. 
 
Section 3. Severability clause. If any clause, sentence, 
paragraph, subdivision, section or part of this act shall be 
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adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, 
such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the 
remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to 
the clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section or part 
thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such 
judgment shall have been rendered. It is hereby declared to 
be the intent of the legislature that this act would have been 
enacted even if such invalid provisions had not been included 
herein. 
 
Section 4. This act shall take effect immediately and shall 
apply to employees hired on and after such date. 
 
 
